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RHETORIC, EVIDENCE, AND BAR
AGENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SPEECH
BY ATTORNEYS
LLOYD B. SNYDERt
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts generally engage in the business of resolving disputes be-
tween litigants based on evidence presented by the parties during the
course of a trial. The party bearing the burden of proof will lose unless
that party presents evidence in support of the claims or defenses
raised in the pleadings. An appellate court will not support the claims
of a party appealing an adverse decision by speculating on whether
the party could have presented evidence in support of his position.
The appellate decision will be based on the record made at trial.
On occasion, a party to a case on appeal will present information
to the appellate court that goes beyond the evidence presented at trial.
The court will be interested in the effect on future cases of a decision
sought by one of the parties. A party can assist the court by present-
ing empirical data about the likely effect of the proposed decision.
The data may establish that a result will be consistent with the public
interest or social policy underlying the law that has given rise to the
dispute.
This practice does not hold true when the United States Supreme
Court decides cases dealing with the constitutionality of state bar reg-
ulatory agency rules that restrict lawyers from exercising their right
to speak. This article will discuss two such rules. The first set of rules
limits the right of attorneys to advertise their services. The second set
of rules restricts the right of attorneys to engage in trial publicity, that
is, to make public statements about matters in litigation.
A common feature of cases contesting the constitutionality of
these rules is that the Supreme Court has not demanded that parties
seeking to muzzle lawyers present evidence or empirical data in sup-
port of their restrictions. The bar disciplinary agencies that prosecute
attorneys for violating these rules offer little data to the Court to jus-
tify their restrictions. In the absence of real information about the
effect of bar rules that restrict lawyers from speaking, the Court has
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based decisions about attorney speech on the kind of speculation that
would not be tolerated in virtually any other field of law. The Court
would better serve the public interest, the interest of attorneys and
bar disciplinary agencies, and the interest of lower courts by demand-
ing that parties seeking to enforce rules restricting attorneys from
speaking present evidence or empirical data justifying the rules.
The failure of the organized bar1 to justify gag rules for attorneys
is two-fold. First, bar disciplinary agencies do not offer evidence that
anyone has been injured by the allegedly improper actions of the law-
yers they seek to discipline. They do not introduce testimony by par-
ties claiming injury because of an attorney's advertisement or public
comment about a trial. The evidence in these cases typically is limited
to proof that an attorney published the allegedly unprotected speech
in violation of a bar rule. Second, bar agencies do not present sound
empirical data in support of their claims that, unless suppressed, the
speech somehow will damage the public interest. In fact, virtually all
of the empirical evidence available on these issues is inconsistent with
claims made by members of the organized bar that attorney advertis-
ing and trial publicity are harmful.2
State bar disciplinary agencies have a long history of suppressing
the First Amendment rights of attorneys. State bar disciplinary agen-
cies also have a long history of losing Supreme Court cases that test
whether these restrictive rules violate attorneys' First Amendment
right to free speech. 3 Despite their abysmal record in defending their
regulations, members of the organized bar persist in trying to limit
what attorneys can say when they advertise and what information at-
torneys can provide to the press when they advocate on behalf of their
clients.
The Supreme Court has invited members of the organized bar to
substitute rhetoric for evidence in cases dealing with the right of at-
torneys to speak. In numerous cases, the Court has given thoughtful
consideration to unsupported claims by the organized bar that public
comment by attorneys presents dangers to the profession. Frequently,
the Court has responded to these claims by speculating about whether
the dangers are as serious as charged or whether restrictions on
speech are necessary to protect against the alleged dangers.4
1. The term "organized bar' refers to the various state and local bar agencies and
associations that establish and enforce rules of conduct for members of the legal
profession.
2. See infra §§ IV, V.A.
3. See infra §§ IV, V.D.
4. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200-06 (1982) (upholding lawyer advertis-
ing); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 372-75 (1977) (same).
[Vol. 28
HeinOnline  -- 28 Creighton L. Rev. 358 1994-1995
SILENCING LAWYERS
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in these cases
appear to reflect the opinions of individual Supreme Court Justices
about whether, as a matter of policy, the profession ought to permit
lawyers to speak. The opinions expressed by the Justices mirror the
debate within the organized bar about whether lawyers should adver-
tise or speak publicly about matters in litigation. Just as the organ-
ized bar advances arguments based on assumption and opinion, so do
the Justices support their decisions based on unsubstantiated specula-
tion regarding the consequences of speech by attorneys.
There are two problems with permitting litigation about attorney
speech to proceed without requiring bar disciplinary agencies to pres-
ent empirical data or other evidence to support claims that restric-
tions on attorney speech are necessary. First, the history of bar
association restrictions on attorney speech should make us skeptical
that the bar rules are based on lofty ideals about protection of the
public. The restrictions began as rules promulgated by elite corporate
lawyers whose effect was to limit the activities of their less affluent
brethren who were representing criminal defendants and other impov-
erished clients.5 The purpose of the rules was to enhance the image of
the corporate lawyers not to protect the public. Fostering the image
that members of the bar are gentlemen is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing speech.
Second, the clients pay the ultimate price when attorney speech is
excessively surpressed. The price is too high to permit a decision
about the constitutionality of suppression to be made without eviden-
tiary support. Excessive suppression of attorney advertising prevents
consumers from being able to obtain information about how to get
legal assistance at an affordable price.6 Excessive restriction on trial
publicity prevents clients from being able to respond adequately to
false or damaging information reported in the press.7 The Supreme
Court should not decide cases about rules restricting attorney speech
that have the potential to threaten the welfare of clients, without de-
manding proof that the rules are necessary to protect against real
harm.
One of the few justifications for relieving a party of its obligation
to present evidence in support of a claim is that it would be difficult or
burdensome for the party to do so.s A court may deal with this prob-
lem by shifting the burden of proof from one party to the other. A
5. See infra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
6. BARLOW F. CHRISTENSON, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 160-72
(1970).
7. See Max D. Stem, The Right of the Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 53 (1983).
8. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 48 (2d ed. 1987).
1995] 359
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court can also recognize a presumption that permits the party to es-
tablish a claim or defense by presenting a limited amount of evi-
dence. 9 In the cases involving restrictions on attorney speech, it is
neither burdensome nor difficult for a bar disciplinary agency to offer
evidence or empirical data in support of its desire to restrict speech.
In 1989, the fifty-three lawyer disciplinary agencies that reported
their activities to the American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") averaged
1,845 complaints per agency and conducted 1,240 investigations per
agency. 10 Surely if consumers were complaining about lawyer adver-
tising or trial publicity, the bar disciplinary agencies receiving client
complaints would have ample evidence of the substance of client
complaints.
In addition to consumer complaints, there are numerous studies
about lawyer advertising and about trial publicity conducted by law-
yers. The A.B.A. Commission on Advertising listed 312 written works
about advertising published between 1972 and 1991.11 Many of these
works include empirical studies about advertising. There are also
many studies about trial publicity. 12 There is no lack of interest in
studying attorney speech. If there are valid grounds for mandating
restrictions on attorney speech, data should be available to confirm
the need for the restrictions.
The Supreme Court would perform a valuable service by stating
clearly and without reservation that speculation, opinion, and rhetoric
are insufficient grounds for suppressing the right to speak. Rather
than speculate about whether attorney speech is harmful or beneficial,
an exercise that encourages the bar to continue to try to restrict attor-
neys from speaking, the Court should insist that the bar provide spe-
cific evidence or empirical data in support of any claims made about
the alleged danger of permitting attorneys to speak.
II. HISTORY
A. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF RULES OF CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS
The American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") has assumed a leading
role in establishing standards of conduct for lawyers. The A.B.A. is a
9. For example, a party can prove notice by showing that a written notice was
sent by mail in a properly stamped and addressed envelope. A court will presume deliv-
ery of notice without the necessity of proof about the progress of the letter through the
postal system.
10. Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems-1989 Data (A.B.A. Center for Profes-
sional Responsibility 1991).
11. JAY W. STEIN, ADVERTISING IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A DESCRIPTIVE BIBLIOG-
RAPHY AND REFERENCE GUIDE (1993).
12. See infra notes 134-50 and accompanying text.
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national organization for lawyers, and has no direct authority to set
standards of lawyer conduct or to discipline attorneys who break the
rules. Standard setting and disciplinary authority rest with the state
bar agencies that license attorneys. The A.B.A. exercises substantial
influence over the state agencies by promulgating and promoting
model standards which serve as the basis for the standards adopted by
the state agencies.
In 1908, the A.B.A. drafted the Canons of Professional Ethics
("Canons"). The A.B.A. adopted the Canons to "celebrate the ancient
lineage of the bar's professional stature" rather than to serve as a ve-
hicle for disciplining shady attorneys. 13 Nevertheless, for the next
sixty years, the Canons served as the primary source of standards fol-
lowed by state bar disciplinary agencies in defining acceptable and un-
acceptable behavior by attorneys. 14 In 1969, the A.B.A. promulgated
the Code of Professional Responsibility (subsequently renamed the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and referred to in this arti-
cle as the "Model Code") to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Unlike the Canons, the Model Code established standards of conduct
in a set of disciplinary rules with the express recognition that attor-
neys who violate those standards should be subject to disciplinary ac-
tion.15 In short order every state adopted standards of conduct for
attorneys based on the standards set forth in the Model Code. 16
In 1983, the A.B.A. approved the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct ("Model Rules") to replace the Model Code. The states did not
line up to establish state bar codes based on the Model Rules with the
same enthusiasm they had evidenced in favor of the Model Code four-
teen years earlier. Some states rejected the Model Rules. Other
states adopted the Model Rules with substantive changes in specific
provisions. At the present time, some sixty-five percent of the states
have codes for attorneys that are based primarily on the format and
substantive rules set forth in the Model Rules. 17
To understand the role of the A.B.A. in establishing standards of
conduct for attorneys, it is necessary to go back to the formation of the
organization. The A.B.A. was founded in 1878 in Saratoga Springs,
New York. Saratoga Springs was a summer vacation spot for wealthy
13. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2, at 54 (1986) [hereinafter
WOLFRAM].
14. Id. at 55-56.
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Preliminary Statement 1983).
16. Wolfram, supra note 13, at 56-57.
17. See LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 01:3 (listing
those states which have adopted standardsbased on the format and substantive rules of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
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Americans, and many of the nation's most influential lawyers visited
there.' These lawyers formed the core of the association.
The A.B.A. evolved during the era when large law firms developed
to serve the needs of America's expanding corporate interests. The
members of these law firms exerted significant influence on the legal
profession, in part, because the members of these firms were the peo-
ple who became members and leaders of the A.B.A. As historian Jer-
old Auerbach explained, "Bar associations were not the exclusive
preserve of corporate lawyers, but lawyers whose practices provided
them with a sufficient margin of wealth and leisure to pay fees, attend
conventions, and participate in committee work were bound to
predominate."19
Throughout its early history, the A.B.A. was an elitist organiza-
tion. To become a member, a lawyer had to be nominated by an attor-
ney from the applicant's state and approved by the A.B.A.
membership. 20 The leadership intended to restrict membership "to
leading men or those of high promise."21 In 1908, when the A.B.A.
promulgated the Canons, only three percent of the nation's lawyers
belonged to the organization. 22
The elitist character of the A.B.A. is reflected in the 1908 Canons.
When the gentlemen who ran the A.B.A. drafted the rules, they did
not obtain data or undertake efforts to determine the need for them.
The draftsmen also did not write rules that regulated the full range of
services provided by attorneys. Instead, they merely cobbled together
the Canons from previously drafted rules of other states. 23 Most of
the provisions in the Canons restricted the actions of sole practition-
ers in urban areas who hustled for clients in a competitive climate. 24
Restrictions against advertising and solicitation,25 for example,
hardly diminished the ability of the major law firms to become known
to corporate clients. 26 These restrictions significantly limited the abil-
ity of lawyers to make their names known to people of modest means
who might need legal assistance, including immigrants, blue collar
workers, and the urban poor.27
18. See EDsoN R. SUNDERLAND, HisToRY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND
ITS WORK (1953) [hereinafter SUNDERLAND] (tracing the history of the creation of the
American Bar Association); GERALD CARSON, A GOOD DAY AT SARATOGA (1978) (same).
19. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 63 (1976) [hereinafter AUERBACH].
20. SUNDERLAND, supra note 18, at 19.
21. SUNDERLAND, supra note 18, at 19.
22. WoLFRAM, supra note 13, at 54 n.23.
23. WoLFRAM, supra note 13, at 54 n.21.
24. AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 42.
25. See infra note 36.
26. AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 42.
27. AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 42.
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Similarly, restrictions on trial or litigation publicity had little im-
pact on corporations. Often the leaders of powerful corporate enter-
prises did not want their conduct to be widely publicized. However,
when they did want publicity, corporate leaders were well able to hire
flacks who could whisper sympathetic information in the ears of
friendly reporters. Attorneys could advise their corporate clients
about when and how to generate favorable publicity without speaking
to reporters personally. In contrast, a lawyer representing an individ-
ual client who lacked wealth and power would not be likely to arrange
for the client to talk to a reporter in order to get a favorable story in
print. Even if there was a reporter willing to talk to the client, the
lawyer would have reason to fear that the client would do more harm
than good by discussing sensitive legal matters in casual conversation
with the reporter. This fear of accidental disclosure would be particu-
larly great when the client had little education or little understanding
of the legal system.
Essentially, the Canons instructed the hoi polloi of the legal pro-
fession how to practice law like gentlemen.28 It mattered little to the
drafters of the Canons that criminal defense lawyers and those who
represented the lower classes were not likely to meet their clients at
the country club, or at Saratoga Springs.
Those sympathetic to the Code contended that "[b]y raising and
maintaining high professional standards, the organized Bar has en-
deavored to take preventive measures to keep in its ranks only those
who have the integrity and training to give clients and the public ade-
quate service."2 9 Less sympathetic commentators have asserted that
"the established bar adopted educational requirements, standards of
admission, and 'canons of ethics' designed to maintain a predomi-
nantly native-born, white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant monopoly of the
legal profession."30 Whatever may have been the purpose behind the
Canons, it is clear that the focus was on matters relating to the court-
room practices of attorneys who represented people of modest means
rather than the conduct of lawyers practicing corporate law.3 1 The
28. Philip Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a
Group Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 244, 245-46 (1968).
29. M. LOUISE RUTHERFORD, THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON
PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGISLATION 86 (1937).
30. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERS' ETHics 3 (1990).
31. Much of the practice of corporate attorneys consisted of advising clients, negoti-
ating agreements, and drafting documents. Of the thirty-two original Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, thirteen dealt primarily with courts and litigation and only two (Canon 8,
advising upon the merits of a client's case, and Canon 9, negotiations with opposite
party) dealt in any way with the work of corporate attorneys. See HENRY S. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 309 (1953) [hereinafter DRINKER] (containing an annotated version of the
Canons of Professional Ethics).
1995] 363
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focus on courtroom practices can still be seen in the Model Code and
the Model Rules. 32 Although the current rules have changed in for-
mat and style, they still deal primarily with the same subject matter
as the Canons and pay relatively little attention to corporate practice.
The failure of the Canons to address the conduct of attorneys rep-
resenting corporate clients was not an oversight. Henry St. George
Tucker, when addressing the A.B.A. convention in 1905, noted Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt's criticism of wealthy, influential attorneys
who helped corporate clients evade the public interest.33 Tucker
urged the members of the association to take President Roosevelt's
charges against the ethics of the profession seriously.34 Subsequently,
Tucker chaired the committee that drafted the Canons.35 In that ca-
pacity, he oversaw the adoption of a set of rules that largely ignored
the conduct of wealthy, influential attorneys. He did so in spite of his
admonition to the members of the bar to carefully consider President
Roosevelt's critical remarks.
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND ATTORNEY CONDUCT
When drafting standards of conduct for lawyers, the A.B.A. has
shown a consistent pattern of subordinating First Amendment values
to the interests of the organized bar. A.B.A. standards have prohib-
ited or restricted advertising and client solicitation by attorneys under
32. WOLFRAM, supra note 13, at 60, 61-63.
33. REPORT OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION 383 (1905) [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT]. Henry St. George Tucker quoted
Roosevelt as follows:
We all know that, as things actually are, many of the most influential and most
highly remunerated members of the Bar in every center of wealth make it their
special task to work out bold and ingenious schemes by which their very
wealthy clients, individual or corporate, can evade the laws which are made to
regulate in the interest of the public the use of great wealth. Now, the great
lawyer who employs his talent and his learning in the highly remunerative
task of enabling a very wealthy client to override or circumvent the law is doing
all that in him lies to encourage the growth in this country of a spirit of dumb
anger against all laws and of disbelief in their efficacy.
Id.
34. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 33, at 384. After noting Roosevelt's remarks,
Tucker stated:
The serious charge made by the President in the above against some of the
members of our profession must give us pause; his recognized position in the
country in stimulating lofty ideals in life, as well as his recognition of the posi-
tion of our profession in moulding public sentiment in the country, forces upon
us, willingly or unwillingly, as an Association, the inquiry, not only whether
the charge be true, but also the broader inquiry whether the ethics of our pro-
fession rise to the high standard which its position of influence in the country
demands; surely no more important question than this can be forced upon the
profession.
A.B.A. Report, supra note 33, at 384.
35. DRINKER, supra note 31, at 24.
[Vol. 28
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the guise of protecting professional values. The drafters of the Canons
asserted that it was unprofessional to solicit clients by advertising.3 6
The Model Code continued the policy of the Canons of barring virtu-
ally all forms of advertising. 37 The Model Rules, although permitting
attorneys to advertise, restricted the type of information that lawyers
could include in advertising material38 as well as the methods by
which attorneys could advertise. 3 9
Over the years, attorneys have contested many of these rules
claiming that the rules interfere with their First Amendment right to
free speech. In defending the rules, attorneys representing the A.B.A.
and state bar associations have presented surprisingly little evidence
to support the evils allegedly prevented by these restrictive code
provisions.
The organized bar has been singularly unsuccessful in defending
First Amendment challenges brought by attorneys. The Supreme
Court repeatedly has supported attorneys claiming that the state bar
restrictions on their rights to advertise and solicit clients conflicted
with the United States Constitution.40
36. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908). The drafters of the Ca-
nons of Professional Ethics stated:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise-
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not war-
ranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional
employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magni-
tude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyers position, and all
other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profes-
sion and are reprehensible; but the customary use of simple professional cards
is not improper.
Id.
37. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1969). The
Code of Professional Responsibility, as promulgated in 1969, provided:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announce-
ments, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means
of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his
behalf.
Id.
38. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1(b)-(c) (1983). The 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibited false and misleading advertising, and
defined such conduct to include a communication that "is likely to create an unjustified
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve" or that "compares the lawyer's serv-
ices with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated."
Id.
39. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 7.3 (1983) (prohibiting attor-
neys from seeking clients by telephone, telegraph, or direct mail).
40. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(striking down restrictions on assertions about certification of specialized skills); Sha-
pero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (striking down restrictions on targeted
direct mail advertising); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
1995]
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In response to court decisions striking down restrictions on adver-
tising, the A.B.A. has amended the Model Code and its successor, the
Model Rules, numerous times. The common pattern has been for the
A.B.A. to modify its standards to permit advertising in accord with the
most recent Supreme Court decisions, while retaining restrictions
about advertising practices not yet considered by the Court. The
A.B.A. amended DR 2-101 of the Model Code in the years 1974, 1975,
1977, and 1978.41 The A.B.A. approved rules 7.1 through 7.4 dealing
with advertising when the association promulgated the Model Rules
in 1983 and then amended these rules in 1989.42
The A.B.A. has a similar history of limiting the comments attor-
neys may make to the public while representing clients during litiga-
tion. The Canons condemned public comment by attorneys about
pending cases. 43 The Model Code severely restricts public comment
about pending cases. While generally denying attorneys the right to
comment on matters in litigation, the Model Code includes detailed
exceptions describing limited information that an attorney can pro-
vide to the media without fear of discipline.44 The Model Rules re-
strict an attorney from publicizing information about pending cases if
the information "will have a substantial likelihood of materially preju-
dicing an adjudicative proceeding."45 The Model Rules specify some
statements that are generally improper, and echo the Model Code by
citing certain information that is deemed to be permissible under this
standard. 46
At the Supreme Court level, there have been fewer constitutional
challenges to restrictions on attorney speech than challenges to adver-
tising restrictions. In the few cases decided by the Court, the organ-
(striking down restrictions on use of illustrations and on use of truthful, non-deceptive
information in newspaper advertisements); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (striking
down restrictions on use of truthful, non-deceptive information in advertising); Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down ban on advertising by
attorneys).
41. SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 265
(John E. Djienkowski, ed. 1994).
42. Id. at 109, 111, 112, 117.
43. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1908). The Canons of Professional
Ethics stated:
Newspaper publication by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due admin-
istration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme cir-
cumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is
unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parts reference to the facts
should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court;
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
Id.
44. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1969).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(a) (1983).
46. Id. Rule 3.6(b)-(c).
[Vol. 28
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ized bar has not been successful in imposing discipline on attorneys
for their conduct.47
III. FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. COMMERCIAL SPEECH STANDARDS
Freedom of speech is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.48 This protection does not mean that the
right to speak is absolute; nor does it mean that there can be no cir-
cumstances in which speech may be limited. A frequently invoked
standard for justifying restrictions on the right to speak is the clear
and present danger test. The United States Supreme Court has held
that the right to speak may be infringed when speech creates a clear
and present danger of an evil that the government has a right to pro-
tect against.49 A party arguing in favor of a provision infringing on
the right to speak has the burden of proving that the provision is nec-
essary to protect against the clear and present danger and that the
questioned provision is no broader than needed to protect against the
danger.50
The First Amendment does not protect all forms of communica-
tion. The Supreme Court has held that obscene forms of communica-
tion are outside the boundaries of constitutionally protected speech.51
Early Court doctrine supported the view that the Constitution also
denied protection to commercial speech. In Valentine v. Chresten-
sen,52 the Court held that purely commercial speech had no informa-
tional value, and therefore was not covered by the First Amendment's
guarantee of the right of free speech.53
In 1976, the Supreme Court reconsidered whether or not commer-
cial speech was protected by the First Amendment in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.54 Specifi-
47. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S.
1030 (1991).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition for a redress of grievances." Id.
49. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,335 (1946); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
50. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-45 (1978) (stating that a legislative
finding of clear and present danger does not relieve party from establishing the exist-
ence of such danger in a particular instance).
51. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484-85 (1957).
52. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
53. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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cally, the Court examined the constitutionality of a state law that pro-
hibited advertising the price of drugs. The Court held that such
advertisements, despite the fact that they were forms of commercial
speech, were protected by the First Amendment. The Court explicitly
declined to state whether the decision applied to advertisements by
attorneys.55 In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,5 6 the Court extended
the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to lawyer
advertisements.
The Supreme Court has not applied the clear and present danger
test to all forms of protected speech. The Court has established alter-
native tests for determining the validity of restrictions against certain
forms of protected speech. In some cases, the restrictions are less pro-
tective of the right to speak than the protection afforded under the
clear and present danger test. After extending the reach of the First
Amendment to commercial speech, the Supreme Court, in Central
Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission,57 set forth the way the
Court would evaluate regulations governing advertising:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis
has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether
the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substan-
tial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.58
The Central Hudson test is not merely a reformulation of the clear
and present danger test. The Court made clear that "[tlhe Constitu-
tion therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to
other constitutionally guaranteed expression."59 If commercial speech
involves unlawful activity or is misleading then, like obscenity, such
speech is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment. Com-
mercial speech that is about lawful activity and is not misleading is
protected. The government may restrict such speech only by estab-
lishing a substantial interest that justifies suppression. Any regula-
55. Virginia State Rd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 773 n.25 (1976).
56. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
57. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
58. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
59. Id. at 562-63.
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tion restricting speech must be tailored to serve the interest that
justifies restriction, and must be limited to that purpose.60
The Court has held that the Central Hudson test is also less pro-
tective of commercial speech than other forms of speech when deter-
mining whether a state restriction is limited to the purpose for which
it has been established. In Board of Trustees v. Fox,6 1 the Court held
that the state can justify a restriction on commercial speech by show-
ing a reasonable fit between the ends sought by the state and the
means chosen to obtain those ends.6 2 The state need not show that it
has chosen the least restrictive measure necessary to achieve its
interest.
Supreme Court doctrine on the nature of constitutional protection
for commercial speech is still developing.6 3 How far the courts will go
in protecting commercial speech is not clear. What is clear is that
commercial speech shares some of the features of traditionally pro-
tected speech. Non-deceptive commercial speech about lawful activity
is subject to restriction only when the state can show a substantial
justification for the restriction and only if the particular restriction is
limited in a reasonable way to the justification.
B. TRIAL PUBLICITY STANDARDS
The Supreme Court also has established a standard different from
the clear and present danger test for determining the constitutionality
of restrictions on public statements by attorneys about pending litiga-
tion. Press coverage involving pending litigation comes within the
ambit of the First Amendment. 64 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,6 5
the Supreme Court held that attorney comment about matters in liti-
gation also is protected under the First Amendment. The Court, in a
five to four decision, established the standard for determining the con-
stitutionality of a restriction on trial publicity by an attorney repre-
60. See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1804 (1993) (striking down state
prohibition against in-person solicitation of clients by certified public accountants);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (striking down statute
prohibiting mailing of unsolicited advertisements regarding contraceptives).
61. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
62. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
63. Compare Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (holding
unconstitutional an ordinance banning distribution of commercial publications from
sidewalk vending machines while permitting distribution of newspapers from vending
machines) with United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (uphold-
ing federal regulation banning lottery advertising by radio stations located in states
where lotteries are illegal).
64. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (striking down gag
order on press in anticipation of a pending trial); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
278 (1941) (striking down limits on public comment about pending cases).
65. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
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senting a party in the trial. The Court held that the First Amendment
permits states to bar attorney speech that creates a substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice to the trial.66
Prior to the Gentile decision, some commentators contended that
the substantial likelihood of material prejudice standard was another
formulation of the clear and present danger test applied to trial pub-
licity.6 7 The Supreme Court's decision clarified that this test estab-
lishes a less exacting standard for parties attempting to suppress
speech by trial counsel than the clear and present danger test.68
Although the standard is less rigorous than the clear and present dan-
ger test, the Gentile standard does recognize that trial publicity can-
not be suppressed absent evidence that the speech will prejudice the
trial, that the harm will be material, and that the likelihood of harm
will be substantial rather than speculative.
The majority decision in Gentile justified the less exacting stan-
dard for restricting trial publicity by attorneys than for restricting
other forms of speech by asserting that trial publicity can jeopardize
the fair administration of justice.69 The right to a fair trial is pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of
law and the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of specific protections for
defendants in criminal cases. The free press - fair trial dichotomy
raises the problem of balancing the constitutionally protected right of
a lawyer to speak while a trial is pending against the constitutionally
protected right of the litigants to a fair trial.70
C. FREE SPEECH, LAWYERS, AND EVIDENCE
These Supreme Court decisions suggest a way to approach dis-
putes about the right to speak. The Constitution creates a bias in
favor of speech that comes within the ambit of the First Amendment.
A party attempting to exercise the right to speak need not present
evidence to establish that the speech will be useful or worthy. The
Constitution relieves the speaker from bearing the burden of justify-
ing the speech. If the contents or subject matter of one speaker's
message is hurtful or inimical to the public interest, the preferred so-
66. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991).
67. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 397 (1985).
68. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074-75.
69. Id.
70. This is referred to as a free press - fair trial issue, because the primary con-
cern of the organized bar has been that the press will report information provided by
attorneys and others and the broadcasting of the information will interfere with the
right of a defendant to a fair trial. See Report of the Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System on the "Free Press - Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1968).
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lution is to invite other speakers to respond and correct the record, not
to prohibit the speech altogether.
A party attempting to suppress protected speech bears a heavy
burden. The party must justify a restriction on speech by showing
that the speech creates a "clear and present danger" of harm, or that
the government has a "substantial interest" in restricting the speech,
or that the speech creates a "substantial likelihood of material preju-
dice." Although the burden on the party attempting to restrict pro-
tected speech may be somewhat greater or less depending on the type
of speech at issue, there must always be a substantial justification for
any limitation placed on the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment.
The party attempting to restrict speech must further prove that
suppression of speech is necessary to protect against the established
danger. If there are means available other than suppression of speech
to protect against the danger, then the Constitution will not tolerate
the restraint of speech. The party also must prove that the restric-
tions imposed are not broader than what is absolutely necessary to
prevent the danger. Here also, the burden imposed on the party seek-
ing to restrict speech may be greater or lesser depending upon the
type of speech. In commercial speech cases, for example, the standard
is whether there is a reasonable fit between the rule limiting speech
and the interest being protected by the rule. Whatever the specific
test, the underlying principle is that any restriction on speech must be
justified by proof that the restriction is limited to the evil it seeks to
remedy.
Some commentators have suggested that there is an additional
justification for permitting restrictions on speech by attorneys, a justi-
fication that supports imposing restrictions that would not be consti-
tutional if applied to others. These commentators contend that
attorneys give up some of their rights under the First Amendment as
a price for being admitted to the bar and made an officer of the court.7 1
This rationalization is not a reasoned principle that can justify deny-
ing First Amendment rights to attorneys that are granted to other citi-
zens. This blanket rationalization is tossed in to add heft to other
arguments for restricting lawyer speech, but the rationale does not
add substance to those arguments. There is no logical reason why the
right to speak should be less respected for those who choose to practice
law. The focus should be on the speech, not the speaker. If speech by
a lawyer creates a threat of harm that the state may protect against,
then the state may act whether or not the speaker is an attorney. If
71. See Louis Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 504, 520 (1965).
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the speech does not create such a threat, the fact that the speaker is
an attorney should not justify suppression.
Lawyers exercise First Amendment rights when they advertise
and when they engage in trial publicity. In both situations, the
Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional dimension of the
rights, but has articulated rationales for affording the rights less pro-
tection than for other First Amendment activity. It is not my purpose
in this article to argue that the Court is necessarily wrong in estab-
lishing less exacting standards for testing bar restrictions on attorney
speech in these areas. My contention is that by whatever standard it
chooses to test restrictions on attorney speech, the Court should de-
mand explicit evidence of injuries caused to some party by the speech
or evidence of specific dangers inherent in the speech before approving
any restrictions.
Typically, cases dealing with the right of attorneys to advertise
arise when a bar disciplinary agency accuses an attorney of violating a
state restriction on advertising. The cases do not arise because an in-
jured client has demanded that the state bar take action against an
offending attorney. The disciplinary agency comes across the offend-
ing advertisement either because one of the members of the agency
sees the advertisement or because another attorney reports the adver-
tisement to the bar agency.72
A bar agency considering whether to discipline an attorney for an
improper advertisement usually has no more evidence to consider
than the advertisement itself and a copy of the state's advertising
rules. In the absence of a complaining consumer, the bar agency will
have no evidence of anyone who has been injured by the questioned
advertisement; nor will the state disciplinary agency have data estab-
lishing a factual foundation for the advertising restriction. If the at-
torney should argue that the restriction is unconstitutional, the state
bar will respond with rhetorical arguments in favor of the rule. As we
shall see, bar agencies have not submitted empirical evidence to sup-
port the claims they have made to justify their restrictions. The his-
tory of the establishment of the restrictions by the American Bar
Association justifies skepticism about the underlying rationale for the
restrictive advertising rules.
Disciplinary cases involving trial. publicity have a similar pattern.
A complaint comes, not from an injured client, but from a bar discipli-
nary agency or another attorney. Proof of a violation consists of a
comparison of the offending remarks by the attorney with the bar
rules. There is a dearth of empirical data justifying the restrictive
72. See infra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
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rules. The bar disciplinary agency supports restrictive trial publicity
rules with rhetoric rather than data.
The Court errs by not stating clearly that the organized bar can-
not impose restrictions on attorney speech without presenting evi-
dence of actual injury by the attorney's conduct or empirical evidence
of dangers that justify restrictive rules. By whatever standard the
Court chooses to test the restrictions on attorney speech, the Court
must test that standard by evidence of what goes on in the real world,
rather than by the unsupported flights of rhetoric presented in the
arguments of state bar agencies. The Constitution's bias in favor of
free speech requires this, at least.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON ADVERTISING BY ATTORNEYS
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,7 3 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Constitution protects the right of attorneys to ad-
vertise. In Bates, counsel for the Arizona State Bar made several ar-
guments to support the contention that the State Bar's prohibition
against lawyer advertising was justified. The State Bar claimed that:
(1) advertising has an adverse effect on professionalism; (2) advertis-
ing is inherently misleading; (3) advertising has an adverse effect on
the administration of justice by stirring up litigation; (4) advertising
has an undesirable economic effect on the profession by increasing the
overhead costs of practicing law; (5) advertising has an undesirable
effect on the quality of legal services; and (6) restrictions on mislead-
ing and deceptive lawyer advertising short of an overall ban are diffi-
cult to enforce. 7 4
The Arizona State Bar provided no empirical data or other evi-
dence to support its arguments. Counsel submitted no information to
the Court indicating that the world outside the courtroom conformed
to the view of the world described to the Justices by the State Bar.
Despite the absence of evidence in support of the State Bar's position,
the Court did not dismiss these arguments out of hand. The members
of the Court took the arguments seriously, and responded to them as if
responses were necessary to justify the Court's decision.
In response to the charge that advertising would adversely affect
professionalism, the Court stated that, "we find the postulated connec-
tion between advertising and the erosion of true professionalism to be
severely strained."75 In the majority decision, Justice Harry Black-
mun opined that most clients recognized that attorneys do not work
for free and noted that the American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") urged
73. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
74. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368-79 (1977).
75. Id. at 368.
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attorneys to establish a clear agreement about fees early in the attor-
ney-client relationship. For these reasons, the majority contended
that disclosing the price of legal services in an advertisement would
not adversely affect professionalism.
The Arizona State Bar argued that attorney advertising is inher-
ently misleading for three reasons: (1) legal services are so individual-
ized that comparisons cannot be made; (2) consumers do not know
prior to talking to an attorney what services they need; and (3) adver-
tising will highlight irrelevant factors to the exclusion of such factors
as skill.7 6 The Court responded to these arguments by simply dis-
agreeing with them. The opinion asserted that some services are rou-
tine, citing as examples uncontested divorces, simple adoptions,
uncontested personal bankruptcies, and name changes. Justice
Blackmun declared it unlikely that many people go to an attorney
without having a specific task in mind, and he rejected the idea that
because advertising may not provide all relevant information about
selecting an attorney, the courts should be permitted to bar lawyers
from providing any relevant information to the public. 77
The State Bar argued that advertising would have an adverse im-
pact on the administration of justice by stirring up litigation. The
Court rejected the notion that it is improper to inform people about
the availability of legal services, on the ground that more people will
take advantage of the availability of the services. 78
In response to the charge that advertising would impact on pro-
fessionalism by diminishing the reputation of attorneys in the commu-
nity, the Court noted that "bankers and engineers advertise, and yet
these professions are not regarded as undignified."79
The State Bar also argued that advertising would drive up the
costs of legal services and inhibit young attorneys from entering the
profession. The Court responded by citing studies showing that the
costs of eyeglasses and drugs were reduced where advertising for
those goods was permitted. In this instance, empirical data not only
failed to support the State Bar's arguments, but refuted its claim
about the evils of advertising. The Court also surmised that advertis-
ing could help young attorneys gain entry to the profession as an effi-
cient way to make their names known to potential clients.80
The State Bar asserted that advertisements would have an ad-
verse effect on the quality of legal services by inducing attorneys to
76. Id. at 372.
77. Id. at 372-75.
78. Id. at 376.
79. Id. at 369-70.
80. Id. at 378.
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provide standard services rather than services tailored to the needs of
the individual clients. The Court rejected a ban on advertising as a
way to prevent "shoddy work" and suggested that streamlining proce-
dures in routine matters might minimize errors and improve
service.81
The State Bar claimed that limits on advertising short of a total
ban would be difficult to enforce, and would be particularly harmful to
consumers who are unsophisticated in legal matters. Justice Black-
mun rejected the notion that permission to advertise would lead to
substantial abuse by members of the profession.8 2
The Court gave respectful consideration to the arguments
presented by the Arizona State Bar and responded with counter argu-
ments or studies suggesting that the State Bar's position lacked merit.
The Court never said that in addition to the fact that the State Bar's
contentions were dubious or unpersuasive, the Bar had submitted no
data to support them.
The effect of the decision in Bates was to recognize that the First
Amendment protected advertisements by lawyers. It is understanda-
ble that the Court, in overturning regulations against lawyer advertis-
ing that had been in effect for almost seventy years, would respond to
every argument raised in support of the ban. In order to justify ex-
tending the reach of the Constitution to lawyer advertisements, the
Court may well have been justified in responding to the contentions of
the organized bar about the evils of advertising with more than a rec-
ognition that the defenders of the restrictions had not provided empir-
ical data to support the restrictions. What is not so understandable is
that the Court did not state what information would be necessary in
future cases to justify restrictions on lawyer advertisements. In sub-
sequent cases about attorney advertisements, the Court has also de-
clined to demand more of the organized bar than speculation and
rhetoric.
Following the decision in Bates, the A.B.A. approved revisions to
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"). The re-
vised rules contained a list of specific information that attorneys
would be permitted to include in advertising. The Model Code revi-
sions barred attorneys from disclosing any information other than
what was specified in the revised code. The A.B.A. drafted the revi-
81. Id. at 378-79. Although the Court cited no support for this proposition, studies
subsequent to the Bates decision confirm that the quality of legal services need not dete-
riorate and, indeed, may improve in a legal clinic that maintains a high volume caseload
of standard cases generated by advertising. See Terry Calvani et al., Attorney Advertis-
ing and Competition at the Bar, 41 VAND. L. REV. 761, 781-86 (1988) (discussing studies
affirming that the quality of legal services may improve with advertising).
82. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379.
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sions to the Model Code without conducting any empirical research or
seeking data to support the need for the restrictions contained in the
new rule.
Many states, including Missouri, adopted revisions to their adver-
tising rules similar to those provided in the A.B.A.'s Model Code. In
In re R.M.J.,83 the Supreme Court considered the provisions of Mis-
souri's rules that had been revised in light of Bates. The attorney who
was disciplined in Missouri violated the revised rules by stating that
his practice included personal injury law and real estate law. The
Missouri rules required him to use the terms tort law and property
law. The attorney's advertisement also announced that he practiced
in the areas of contract, zoning and land use, communication, and pen-
sion and profit sharing law. Missouri's rules did not authorize the use
of these terms or any analogous terms describing these areas of prac-
tice. The attorney further violated the state rules by stating that he
was admitted to practice in Missouri and Illinois and by stating that
he was admitted to practice in the United States Supreme Court. The
Missouri rules did not authorize these assertions.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Missouri Supreme
Court's decision to discipline the attorney for making these unauthor-
ized disclosures in his advertisements. The Court concluded that dis-
closure of the various areas of practice was not misleading, even
though not specifically authorized by the Missouri rules.84 The Mis-
souri Advisory Committee8 5 could not identify any substantial inter-
est in denying an attorney the right to state where he is licensed to
practice law.8 6
Justice Powell, authoring the majority opinion, recognized that an
attorney's advertisement that included the fact that the attorney is
admitted to practice before the Supreme Court "could be misleading to
the general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to
the bar of this Court."8 7 However, the decision noted that there had
been no such finding by the Missouri Supreme Court when it approved
the attorney's discipline, and that there was nothing in the record to
indicate that the information was misleading.88 In the absence of
proof that the information was misleading, the Supreme Court was
correct in rejecting the state's attempt to discipline the attorney for
83. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
84. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982).
85. The Advisory Committee is a standing committee of the Missouri Supreme
Court and is responsible for prosecuting disciplinary cases. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at
194 n.5.
86. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 205-06.
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his advertisement. The decision should have stated clearly that such
proof would be required in the future.
Missouri also disciplined the attorney for sending announcements
about his practice to persons other than lawyers, clients, former cli-
ents, personal friends, and relatives. The Supreme Court rejected this
justification for discipline. The Missouri Supreme Court had offered
no reason for restricting the parties who could receive the attorney's
announcements. Furthermore, the Missouri Advisory Committee did
not attempt to show that the absolute prohibition on sending an-
nouncements to people other than friends, relatives, and clients was
necessary to serve any legitimate interests of the state. In the face of
a silent record, this restriction could not stand.8 9
In In re R.M.J., the organized bar continued with the pattern that
began with Bates. The Missouri Bar sought to prohibit advertising
practices by speculating that evils would arise unless the Court ap-
proved strict limits on the content of ads. In making such an argu-
ment, the Missouri Bar did not go to the trouble of seeking empirical
evidence to support the claim that evil lurked in the ads; nor did the
Bar produce evidence that a ban on attorney speech would prevent the
alleged evils.
In the decision in In re R.M.J., the Supreme Court had an oppor-
tunity to spell out the type of evidence that would be required in order
to justify restrictions on attorney advertising. The Court noted the
failure of the Missouri Bar to make a record that supported the bar's
claims about the reasons for the restrictions. However, the Court used
the failure of the Missouri Bar merely as a reason for rejecting the
bar's position in the case, not as a flaw that would cause the Court to
reject restrictions on advertising in future cases. Rather than inform-
ing state disciplinary agencies what would be required in the future to
justify advertising restrictions, the decision did no more than tell the
Missouri Bar that one reason it had not prevailed was that it had not
supported its arguments in that case adequately.
This pattern continued in the case of Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel.90 In Zauderer, Ohio sought to discipline an attorney
for including information in a newspaper advertisement that dealt
with a specific legal dispute, the claims of numerous women who had
been injured by using the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device as a con-
traceptive. The advertisement included a line drawing of the device
and described injuries it had allegedly caused to women. In response
to articles indicating that the statute of limitations had run on suits
89. Id. at 206.
90. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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related to the Dalkon Shield, the advertisement asserted that women
should not assume that it is too late to take legal action.
Ohio justified the attempt to discipline Zauderer by claiming that,
although his advertisement may have been harmless, the State's ban
on advertising related to specific legal problems was necessary as a
prophylactic device to prevent other attorneys from using false and
misleading advertising to stir up frivolous litigation.91 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, stating:
We do not believe that the State has presented a convinc-
ing case for its argument that the rule before us is necessary
to the achievement of a substantial governmental interest.
The State's contention that the problem of distinguishing de-
ceptive and nondeceptive legal advertising is different in kind
from the problems presented by advertising generally is
unpersuasive....
* * *
Were we to accept the State's argument in this case, we
would have little basis for preventing the government from
suppressing other forms of truthful and nondeceptive adver-
tising simply to spare itself the trouble of distinguishing such
advertising from false or deceptive advertising. The First
Amendment protections afforded commercial speech would
mean little indeed if such arguments were allowed to
prevail.92
The State raised similar arguments for the claim that it should be
able to bar attorneys from using illustrations in advertisements. The
Court rejected this claim, saying:
The State's arguments amount to little more than unsup-
ported assertions: nowhere does the State cite any evidence
or authority of any kind for its contention that the potential
abuses associated with the use of illustrations in attorneys'
advertising cannot be combatted by any means short of a
blanket ban.93
Once again, the Court rejected a justification by a bar disciplinary
agency for its restrictions on advertising. Once again, the Court cited
the failure of the State to produce evidence in support of its justifica-
tion for the restriction. And, once again, the Court failed to tell the
states that they could not expect to prevail in advertising cases in the
future if they do not provide some evidence to support their arguments
for the restrictions they seek to impose.
91. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 643 (1985).
92. Id. at 644-46.
93. Id. at 648.
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The Court in Zauderer departed from its approach to advertising
restrictions in one respect. Zauderer's advertisement stated that cli-
ents would owe no legal fees if there were no recovery. The State ar-
gued that it had the right to demand that the advertisement also
include a statement that the client would be subject to litigation costs
even if there was no recovery. Zauderer argued that the State could
not sustain such a rule absent evidentiary support that the rule was
necessary to serve a substantial government interest. The Court re-
fused to require such evidence in cases involving additional disclosure
requirements. Although burdensome or unnecessary disclosures
would violate the First Amendment, the Court held that "an adver-
tiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure require-
ments are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
deception of consumers."94
This element of Zauderer provided the Court with an opportunity
to explain why states must provide evidence to support restrictions on
attorney advertisements. Reasonable disclosure requirements permit
an attorney to publish a commercial message while protecting the
public from potentially misleading information. So long as the addi-
tional disclosure requirement is not burdensome, the attorney is able
to convey the message. A rule suppressing speech prevents the public
from receiving the attorney's message. Because the consequences of
suppression of speech are more extreme than the consequences of re-
quiring additional disclosures, the party seeking to suppress speech
should bear the burden of supporting the need for suppression with
empirical data or other evidence of harm to consumers occasioned by
the speech. Unfortunately, the Court failed to articulate this distinc-
tion or to establish any method for determining the need for restric-
tions on speech.
Why has the Court been reluctant to articulate a standard requir-
ing States to introduce empirical evidence when they seek to restrict
commercial speech by lawyers? One answer is suggested by Shapero
v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n.95 The issue in Shapero was whether the con-
stitutional protections afforded lawyer advertising apply to targeted
direct mail solicitation sent by lawyers to potential clients.
Prior to the Shapero decision, the Court had ruled, in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n,96 that a state could ban direct face-to-face solici-
tation of potential clients by attorneys. The Court justified the direct
solicitation ban as a prophylactic measure to protect against the po-
tential for abuse inherent in such solicitations. In Shapero, the Ken-
94. Id. at 651.
95. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
96. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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tucky Bar Association argued that direct mail solicitation should be
barred under the rationale of the Ohralik decision. Shapero con-
tended that direct mail solicitation should be protected as a form of
speech similar to newspaper and other media advertising.97
The Supreme Court, in a split decision, ruled that under the First
Amendment a state may not categorically prohibit lawyers from solic-
iting business by sending truthful, nondeceptive letters to potential
clients known to face particular legal problems. The Court analogized
targeted direct mail solicitation to advertising, rather than to personal
solicitation.
The dissent in Shapero by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, is instructive.
Justice O'Connor would have approved much greater deference to the
opinions of state bar officials about the propriety of ads. The dissent
contended that "the [s]tates should have considerable latitude to ban
advertising that is 'potentially or demonstrably misleading,' as well as
truthful advertising that undermines the substantial governmental
interest in promoting the high ethical standards that are necessary in
the legal profession."98
The dissenters would have approved, for example, a ban on attor-
ney advertisements that announced the price for routine services. 99 It
is just this kind of basic information that the Court approved in Bates
when it held that the Constitution prohibited a total ban on attorney
advertising. If the majority had been willing, as were the dissenters,
to defer to the judgment of state bar officials on the propriety of basic
factual information in lawyer ads, then states could have banned ad-
vertisers from providing almost any useful information to consumers.
The dissenters in Shapero clearly were hostile to lawyer advertis-
ing. The dissenters surmised that attorneys would not be able to
maintain high professional standards while advertising prices for rou-
tine services:
Furthermore, such advertising practices will undermine
professional standards if the attorney accepts the economic
risks of offering fixed rates for solving apparently simple
problems that will sometimes prove not to be so simple after
all. For a lawyer to promise the world that such matters as
uncontested divorces can be handled for a flat fee will inevita-
bly create incentives to ignore (or avoid discovering) the com-
97. Ohralick v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 469-72 (1978).
98. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 485 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted) (quoting In re R.M.J, 455 U.S. at 202 (emphasis in original)).
99. Id.
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plexities that would lead a conscientious attorney to treat
some clients' cases as anything but routine. 100
The dissenters cited no evidence or data in support of this asser-
tion. In fact, the available evidence refutes this claim. A study com-
paring the quality of services rendered by a legal clinic to that of
traditional law firms found the ratings for the clinics to be superior in
all categories. 101 The same study reviewed the results obtained by
attorneys in divorce cases and concluded that the quality of legal rep-
resentation by attorneys in the legal clinic was equal to or better than
that of traditional law firms. l0 2
This study explained these conclusions as follows:
As firms have larger planned volumes, they can lower
their per-unit costs and, accordingly, their prices. Costs drop
because large-volume production techniques are different
from small-volume ones. This phenomenon apparently ap-
plies to "the last of the cottage industries," the delivery of
legal services to individuals. By greater use of specialization,
paralegals, and systems management as well as by the sub-
stitution of capital for labor, the costs of providing routine
services such as divorce can be reduced significantly. These
low-cost techniques appear to explain the ability of the legal
clinic to reduce prices. Further, the techniques reveal why
quality need not drop and may even increase. Since the clinic
does not drop prices by reducing the amount of care on each
case, quality need not decline. To the extent that, for exam-
ple, the clinic increases specialization and better controls its
caseload, quality may improve, as is apparently the case with
Jacoby & Meyers. 10 3
A survey of malpractice claims in Florida provides some addi-
tional support for the proposition that advertising does not adversely
affect the quality of legal services. The survey indicated that law
firms that advertise were not more likely than other firms to be
charged with legal malpractice.' 0 4
The dissenters in Shapero also repeatedly speculated about the
dangers of targeted direct mail advertising without citing one piece of
evidence in support. Justice O'Connor stated:
First, a personalized letter is somewhat more likely "to
overpower the will and judgment of laypeople who have not
100. Id. at 485-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Fred McChesney & Timothy Muris, Advertising and the Price and Quality of
Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1 AM. B. FouNmD. Rzs. J. 179, 193-201 (1979).
102. Id. at 201-06.
103. Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
104. See Scott Slonum, Survey: Ads not Drawing Malpractice Claims, 67 A.B.A. J.
25 (1981).
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sought [the lawyer's] advice." For people whose formal con-
tacts with the legal system are infrequent, the authority of
the law itself may tend to cling to attorneys just as it does to
police officers. Unsophisticated citizens, understandably in-
timidated by the courts and their officers, may therefore find
it much more difficult to ignore an apparently "personalized"
letter from an attorney than to ignore a general
advertisement.
Second, "personalized" form letters are designed to sug-
gest that the sender has some significant personal knowledge
about, and concern for, the recipient. Such letters are reason-
ably transparent when they come from somebody selling con-
sumer goods or stock market tips, but they may be much
more misleading when the sender belongs to a profession
whose members are ethically obliged to put their clients' in-
terests ahead of their own.
Third, targeted mailings are more likely than general ad-
vertisements to contain advice that is unduly tailored to serve
the pecuniary interests of the lawyer.10 5
In the dissenting opinion in Shapero, three Justices of the
Supreme Court appraised the potential of targeted direct mail adver-
tising to deceive the public without so much as a scintilla of evidence
for support.
Perhaps the dissent in Shapero explains why the Court has not
been willing to tell the organized bar that states have an obligation to
present evidence in support of claims that various attorney advertis-
ing practices are harmful and should be prohibited. At least three of
the Justices were willing to engage in speculation about the dangers of
advertising, and to defer to the speculation of state bar representa-
tives about such dangers, without considering the available evidence.
With such a divided Court, it may be that the majority could not
have come together on a decision instructing states to provide proof of
allegations about the alleged harms caused by attorney advertise-
ments. But, this failure has not served the organized bar or the Court
well. Decisions like Shapero do little more than encourage states to
continue restricting advertising hoping that with a little more extrav-
agant rhetoric or a little more speculation they can win over another
Justice or two at the next argument.
The Court revisited the issue of state bar restrictions on advertis-
ing in the case of Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n. 106 In that case, the State of Illinois disciplined an attorney
105. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 481-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 643).
106. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
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for stating on his letterhead that he was certified as a civil trial spe-
cialist by the National Board of Trial Advocacy.
Again, the State tried to justify disciplining the attorney without
offering any evidence that any person had been or was likely to be
misled or deceived by the statement. Once again, the State argued
that the advertisement's potential for deception justified a blanket
ban on announcing certification of a specialty. And, once again, the
Supreme Court refused to accept such a broad restriction on speech in
the absence of any evidence supporting the need for the restriction.
The Peel decision also reinforced the standard for imposing addi-
tional disclosure requirements articulated in Zauderer. The majority
opinion, written by Justice John Paul Stevens, as well as a concurring
opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall, and a dissenting opinion by
Justice Byron White, agreed that the assertion of a certification of ex-
pertise had the potential to mislead some consumers. 10 7 The majority
and concurring opinions recognized that, under the Constitution, Illi-
nois could have reduced this potential by enacting reasonable regula-
tions requiring additional disclosures.' 08
In Peel, as in Shapero, Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia
dissented. 10 9 Justice O'Connor noted that although there was no evi-
dence that the certification of specialization actually misled anyone,
the Court should nonetheless defer to the Illinois Supreme Court
which found that the statement was "inherently likely to deceive." 110
Why should the Supreme Court 'defer to state supreme courts in
making this judgment? The state supreme court justices had no evi-
dence and no empirical data from which to make such a judgment.
They had no reports of individuals who were, in fact, deceived. As is
typical in these cases, a state disciplinary official, not a complaining
client, charged Peel with violating state standards on advertising."'
Justice O'Connor relied on an assumption of expertise by the state
courts to substitute for the lack of evidence:
Charged with the duty of monitoring the legal profession
within the State, the Supreme Court of Illinois is in a far bet-
ter position than is this Court to determine which statements
are misleading or likely to mislead. Although we are the final
arbiters on the issue whether a statement is misleading-as a
107. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 106 (1990);
id. at 111 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 118 (White, J., dissenting).
108. Peel, 496 U.S. at 100, 111 (Marshall, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 119 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
110. Peel, 496 U.S. at 120-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting In Re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982)).
111. Peel, 496 U.S. at 97.
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matter of constitutional law, we should be more deferential to
the State's experience with such statements." 2
Justice O'Connor suggested in her dissent that the states have
considerable experience in assessing the subtleties of the English lan-
guage to determine what statements bear such a high risk of deceiving
the public that they may be prohibited. But the organized bar has no
such experience. The bar's experience is a relentless hostility to all
forms of advertising first formalized in 1908 and extending until the
Bates decision in 1976. Following that, the bar's experience has been
to engage in repeated attempts to minimize the information attorneys
may provide to consumers without so much as a whisper by consumers
that the restrictions were needed. Indeed, one of the few agencies that
has had any experience at determining what kinds of assertions in
advertising are likely to mislead the public is the Federal Trade Com-
mission. That agency is mandated by law to establish rules for the
prevention of deceptive advertising. 113 The Federal Trade Commis-
sion filed an amicus brief in Peel asserting that the likelihood that a
lawyer's notification of certification would deceive the public is
minimal." 4
Justice O'Connor clearly disclosed how far she would go in defer-
ring to a claim that an assertion by an attorney is potentially mislead-
ing. She speculated that "the meaning underlying a claim of [National
Board of Trial Advocacy] certification is neither common knowledge
nor readily verifiable by the ordinary consumer."115 She stated that
"certification is tantamount to a claim of quality and superiority and is
therefore inherently likely to mislead."116 She alleged that the state-
ment of certification coupled with a statement of the states in which
an attorney is licensed to practice "leads to the conclusion that the
State licenses the lawyer's purported superiority." 1 7 She opined that
"[a]s it is common knowledge that [s]tates police the ethical standards
of the profession, that inference is likely to be especially
misleading."118
How do we know whether these claims are true? There is not one
shred of evidence in the record to support any of them. They are true
only in the sense that a number of people with strong views about
attorney advertising believe them to be true. They are true in the
sense that an attorney who, for whatever reason, wanted to prevent
112. Id. at 121 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1993).
114. Peel, 496 U.S. at 104-05.
115. Id. at 122 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 123 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 123-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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disclosure of certification of specialization by other attorneys, could al-
lege that they are true without appearing to be foolish. They are rhe-
torical truths. They are opinions. But they are not descriptions of the
real world based upon anything found in the record of the case before
the Court. In the absence of any information more substantial than
these opinions, the Court was correct in refusing to permit the State of
Illinois to discipline attorney Peel for his publication of the truth that
he was certified as a civil trial specialist by the National Board of Trial
Advocacy.
Why would three members of the Court argue that they should
defer to state supreme court justices to decide whether lawyer adver-
tising is potentially misleading? Why should the dissenters contend
that the states should be able to bar such advertisements in the ab-
sence of empirical evidence justifying such drastic action? The answer
can be found in the culture of the legal profession.
There is ample evidence that lawyers generally have significantly
different opinions about lawyer advertising than consumers. The evi-
dence is gathered in a recent review of fifteen studies on opinions
about such advertising. 119 The studies are of three types, reports of
attorneys' opinions, reports of consumers' opinions, and comparisons
of attitudes of attorneys and consumers. Various investigators con-
ducting the studies between 1978 and 1991 found that consumers gen-
erally had positive attitudes about lawyer advertising, while attorneys
generally had negative attitudes. Comparative studies disclosed a
consistent pattern of attorneys holding opinions that are less
favorable to advertising than the opinions of consumers.
There are many reasons why lawyers have negative attitudes
about advertising. According to a study by Cutler, Javalgi, and
Schimmel the negative tone begins in law school with its emphasis on
law as service and deemphasis of law as a profit making venture. 1 20
The "corporate cultures" of the law firms perpetuate the negative atti-
tude. Attorneys, particularly those who entered the profession prior
to the Bates decision, "have internalized and made cultural the belief
that advertising is akin to selling unneeded products and is therefore
undignified and demeaning to the firm."12 1
Consumers have a significantly different perspective on
advertising:
119. Robert Cutler et al., The Advertising of Legal Services: Attorneys Versus Con-
sumers, J. PROF. SERV. MKTG. (forthcoming), reviewed by, LAWYER ADVERTISING NEWS,
Feb. 1993, at 3 [hereinafter LAWYER ADVERTISING NEWS].
120. LAWYER ADVERTISING NEWS, supra note 119, at 8.
121. LAWYER ADVERTISING NEWS, supra note 119, at 9.
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Consumer attitudes toward legal services advertising
tend to the positive because of the consumers' felt need for
information prior to making a decision. Word-of-mouth refer-
rals are valued for important decisions like this-but many
times the consumer needing an attorney has no source for
such referrals. The observation and reading of advertise-
ments by legal service providers are valued because: (1) ad-
vertisements may be the only source of information, and (2)
advertisements are a time-efficient method for obtaining
information. 12 2
These studies demonstrate that the negative attitude many attor-
neys have about advertising is unrelated to the value of advertising to
the public. That attitude is related to the image lawyers have of them-
selves and their profession.
Angry clients do not generate complaints about attorney advertis-
ing. It is rare for clients to initiate grievances about advertising. 123
State disciplinary agencies generate these complaints. 124 Although
these agencies couch their complaints in terms of concern about decep-
tion of the public, it is evident that the real concern is about self-image
rather than the public interest. Surely if their concerns were for the
interest of consumers, members of the organized bar would be willing
and able to produce evidence of injury to the public from the forms of
lawyer advertising they disapprove. In the absence of such evidence,
the Supreme Court should continue to give broad latitude to lawyers
to advertise their services.
V. RESTRICTIONS ON TRIAL PUBLICITY
The American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") also has imposed signifi-
cant restrictions on the right of attorneys to speak about matters that
122. LAWYER ADVERTISING NEWS, supra note 119, at 10.
123. Indeed, it is rare for anyone to complain about lawyer advertising. Quarterly
reports of grievances filed against attorneys in Ohio between 1988 and 1991 report that
grievances about advertising and solicitation constituted 1.2% of all grievances. State
reports submitted to the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibil-
ity in the years 1990-1992 reveal either that the states do not report complaints about
advertising as a separate category, or that the advertising complaints amount to 1%-2%
of the total complaints about attorney conduct (reports available at the office of the
author).
124. See Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems Chart X, (A.B.A. Center for Profes-
sional Responsibility Standing Committee on Professional Discipline 1989). The cases
on advertising also make clear that advertising complaints are generated by state disci-
plinary personnel rather than consumers. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629-32 (discussing
an advertising complaint generated by staff attorney of the Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel). No court decision about attorney advertising has reported that the action resulted
from a complaint registered by a client or potential client.
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are or likely will be in litigation. 125 Despite extensive discussion
about the rules in this area, the organized bar has offered little empir-
ical data in support of the claim that these restrictions are necessary
to satisfy a legitimate governmental interest.
Why should there be any restrictions on what an attorney may
say to a reporter about a pending case?, The traditional answer is that
the information may be published by the reporter and become known
to members of the jury sitting on the case. If the jurors decide the case
based on information other than the evidence presented in the court-
room, then the defendant has been denied the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a trial by an impartial jury. 12 6
As was true about restrictions on lawyer advertising, restrictions
on lawyer comment about matters in litigation stem from the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons").127 The effect of the Canons
was to prevent attorneys for small businesses and individual clients
from talking to reporters about their clients' cases. The rule had little
impact on large corporations who could hire public relations special-
ists to speak to reporters on behalf of the corporation. But the real
impetus for maintaining strict limits on what attorneys may say to the
press about litigation matters arose from two events, the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy in 1963, and the Supreme Court's
reversal of Sam Sheppard's murder conviction in 1966.
These events gave rise to an effort by the A.B.A. to resolve what
came to be known as the free press - fair trial dilemma. Curiously,
the Oswald affair, stemming from President Kennedy's assassination,
did not involve disclosure of information to the press by attorneys;
and, in the Sheppard case, the disclosure of information by attorneys
was a relatively minor part of the Supreme Court's concern when it
reversed Sam Sheppard's conviction.
The news media gave massive coverage to the assassination of
President Kennedy. Shortly after the assassination, President Lyn-
don Johnson appointed a commission, chaired by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, to investigate, evaluate, and report to the President about
"all the facts and circumstances surrounding [the] assassination."128
The Warren Commission report included the opinion that it would
125. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (1992); MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1981).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Id.
127. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 20 (1908); see supra note 43.
128. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY 471 app. 1 (1964).
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have been difficult for Lee Harvey Oswald to have received a fair trial.
The report stated:
A fundamental objection to the news policy pursued by
the Dallas police, however, is the extent to which it endan-
gered Oswald's constitutional right to a trial by an impartial
jury. Because of the nature of the crime, the widespread at-
tention which it necessarily received, and the intense public
feelings which it aroused, it would have been a most difficult
task to select an unprejudiced jury, either in Dallas or
elsewhere.129
Note that the Warren Commission's report suggested that im-
panelling a jury would be difficult because of the disclosures of infor-
mation by the police, not disclosures by attorneys. Note also that the
commission's opinion could not have been tested because Oswald had
been killed two days after the assassination of the President.
There is an air of unreality about the report's concern for Mr. Os-
wald's constitutional rights. Did the members of the Warren Commis-
sion truly believe that the assassination of a President would not
trigger a tremendous amount of news coverage? It is inconceivable
that the coverage would not have included rumor, gossip, and surmise,
some of which would subsequently prove to have been inaccurate.
Moreover, under any circumstances, it would be difficult to seat an
unbiased jury in the murder trial of a person charged with killing the
President of the United States. It is pure conjecture to assume that
the problem of seating an unbiased jury would be substantially more
difficult because the police (or attorneys) provided some of the infor-
mation and misinformation reported in the immediate aftermath of an
assassination.
The second event triggering increased concern about litigation
disclosures by lawyers was the Supreme Court's reversal of the mur-
der conviction of Sam Sheppard. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 130 the
Court held that extensive prejudicial press coverage surrounding the
trial and the failure of the trial judge to prevent the press from turn-
ing the trial into a "Roman holiday" where "bedlam reigned" denied
Sheppard the right to a fair trial. 13 ' While some of the information
provided to the press about the case came from attorneys, including
the prosecutor, much of it also came from other sources including wit-
nesses, family members, and "especially the Coroner and police
officers." 1 3 2
129. Id. at 238.
130. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
131. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354-63 (1966).
132. Id. at 360.
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Thus, there were two problems that had a significant impact on
the Sheppard trial. The first was the court's failure to prevent report-
ers from virtually taking over the courtroom and turning the trial into
a spectacle. This problem had nothing to do with the source of infor-
mation provided to reporters. The second problem, the extensive prej-
udicial coverage by the press, involved lawyers among a large number
of people who spoke to reporters. In light of the history of the case, it
is difficult to believe that the level of prejudice or the result in the case
would have been different even if neither the prosecutor nor defense
counsel had spoken a word to any reporter. 133 There were too many
sources of information for reporters and too much public interest in
the case for the amount of news coverage to have been influenced by
whether attorneys were or were not an additional source of
information.
There is a significant difference between the bar rules restricting
attorney comment about disputes in litigation and the rules restrict-
ing attorney advertisements. In the advertising cases, the bar could
cite no constitutional interest that might be compromised by permit-
ting attorneys to speak. In the trial publicity cases, the bar has
framed the issue as a balance between the need to protect a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution and the need to protect the rights of free speech and
press.' 3 4 If publication of information about the subject matter of a
trial threatens the right of a defendant in a criminal case to a fair
trial, then there is a clear, substantial government concern that may
require restrictions on speech. Moreover, because the clash involves
two constitutionally protected rights, it would arguably be legitimate
for a body such as the A.B.A. to make considered judgments about how
to balance the two rights without requiring the empirical evidence de-
manded in the advertising cases.
Despite its surface appeal, this rationale for restricting trial pub-
licity is flawed. Placing restrictions on the right of attorneys to talk to
journalists about cases does not protect a defendant's right to a fair
trial. Analyzing this question involves looking at three issues. First,
what is the scope of the problem of prejudicial trial publicity? Second,
what impact does restricting the right of attorneys to speak have on
the problem? Third, are there other adequate alternatives to restrict-
133. See PAUL HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE 45-62 (1961).
134. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (REARDON COMMIT-
TEE), STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 16-18 (Approved Draft,
1968); SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (MEDINA COMMITTEE), FREE-
DOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, Introduction (1967).
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ing the right of attorneys to speak that can protect defendants from
being prejudiced by trial publicity?
A. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM OF PREJUDICIAL TRIAL PUBLICITY
Prejudicial trial publicity arises, not because lawyers decide to
talk to representatives of the press, but because the media chooses to
cover a case that is or will be coming to trial. How frequently does this
problem arise?
Empirical data reveals that the incidence of prejudicial news re-
porting interfering with the right of defendants to get fair trials is
rare. In a 1970 study funded by the Twentieth Century Fund, investi-
gators compared federal felony cases in the District of Columbia with
news stories in the Washington Post.l3 5 Of the 1,509 defendants in-
dicted in the District of Columbia, only twenty percent were ever men-
tioned at any time in the press. 13 6 Only two percent of the cases
involved sufficient publicity to raise the possibility of prejudice. l3 7
The outcome of those cases was about the same statistically as the
outcome of the other cases. 138 This indicates that prejudice did not
poison those cases in which publicity created the theoretical possibil-
ity of prejudice.
That the reporting of "prejudicial" information does not necessar-
ily deny a defendant the right to a fair trial is confirmed by a second
study of newspaper accounts of criminal cases. In a review of the cov-
erage of criminal cases in a midwestern state, the investigators found
potentially prejudicial information in a substantial number of cases.
But, they found no correlation between the potentially prejudicial re-
ports and guilty verdicts. 13 9
Another study reported that prejudicial press coverage of criminal
cases is rare. That study indicated that pretrial publicity is a poten-
tial issue in one out of 10,000 cases. 140 This is due to the small
number of felony cases that are reported by the media coupled with
the even smaller number of these cases that proceed to trial.
That prejudicial press coverage in criminal trials is rare is further
supported by a study conducted by Richard Cardwell, counsel for the
135. See A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967) [hereinafter
FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB].
136. Id. at 61.
137. Id. at 63.
138. Id. at 66.
139. Thomas Eimermann & Rita Simon, Newspaper Coverage of Crimes and Trials:
Another Empirical Look at the Free Press-Fair Trial Controversy, 47 JOURNALISM Q. 142
(1970).
140. Ralph Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of Trials Prejudiced by Press Cover-
age, 72 JUDICATURE 162, 169 (1988).
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Hoosier State Press Association. Cardwell found that between 1963
and 1965, only sixty-nine appellate decisions dealt with claims of prej-
udicial pretrial publicity. The claims prevailed in a mere five percent
of these few cases. Prejudicial news coverage during trial was dis-
cussed in thirty-two cases between 1963 and 1965. In only three of
these cases did a court find that prejudicial publicity warranted grant-
ing relief. 141
Data gathered from judges, attorneys, and prisoners also gener-
ally support the view that prejudicial press coverage is not considered
to be a significant problem by the people who are most intimately in-
volved in the criminal system.142 A commentator who reviewed these
studies on the incidence of press-induced prejudice concluded that
"[t]aken together, the research suggests that in an absolute, quantita-
tive sense, prejudicial publicity is a small problem." 143
There are two studies that claim to support the theory that preju-
dicial trial publicity is a serious problem. The first is a report spon-
sored by the A.B.A. The A.B.A. established the Advisory Committee
on Fair Trial and Free Press in 1964. The Committee came to be
known as the Reardon Committee, named after its chairman Paul C.
Reardon, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts. 144 The Reardon Committee concluded that excessive trial
publicity was prejudicing a growing number of defendants. However,
the Reardon Committee's conclusions are seriously flawed.
Among its shortcomings, the Reardon Committee failed to obtain
professional researchers. Rather than secure a social scientist to over-
see empirical research, the Committee entrusted its research to a law
school student who took a leave of absence from his legal studies. 145
Moreover, the Reardon Committee failed to take advantage of one of
the most useful ways to assess the affect of out of court commentary on
the deliberations of juries, reviewing actual jury deliberations. The
organized bar traditionally has considered jury deliberations to be sac-
rosanct, and has frowned on efforts by investigators to witness the
process. When the University of Chicago Jury Project recorded the
deliberations of a civil jury trial in 1954, the furor generated by the
141. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARB, supra note 135, at 58.
142. See Robert E. Drechsel, An Alternative View of Media-Judiciary Relations:
What the Non-Legal Evidence Suggests About the Fair Trial-Free Press Issue, 18 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1, 16-19 (1989). See Fred S. Siebert, Trial Judges' Opinions on Prejudicial
Publicity in Free Press and Fair Trial, in FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 1 (Chilton R. Bush
ed., 1970) [hereinafter FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL].
143. Drechsel, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV., at 16.
144. PAUL C. REARDON, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, VII
(1966) [hereinafter REARDON].
145. ADVISORY COMMIrrEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (REARDON COMMITTEE),
STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS ix (Tentative Draft 1966).
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Project was great enough to result in a congressional investigation. 146
There have been few attempts to invade the jury room since then. As
might be expected, the researcher for the Reardon Committee steered
clear of any attempts to look at actual jury deliberations.
The Reardon Committee recognized that the problem of prejudi-
cial news coverage, while difficult to quantify, was not massive in
scope:
Any effort to assess the magnitude of the problem - the
number of cases in which serious questions of possible preju-
dice are raised by news coverage and public statements - is
bound ultimately to rest in some degree on inference. It is
certain that in relative terms, when compared with the total
number of crimes or even the total number of criminal pro-
ceedings, the problem is of limited proportions. 147
The Reardon Committee came to this conclusion in part because
the problem of prejudicial news coverage primarily applies in jury
cases and the Committee found that in 1964 only eight percent of
criminal cases in federal courts proceeded to jury trial. 148 Nonethe-
less, the Reardon Committee concluded that prejudice was a substan-
tial problem in the few instances where it was found.
The research methodology used by the Reardon Committee is
problematic. The Committee based its conclusion on three sources:
(1) a survey of defense lawyers; (2) a survey of judges; and (3) an anal-
ysis of criminal reporting in a number of newspapers. Conclusions de-
rived from these sources are suspect. Journalism Professor Robert C.
Drechsel critiqued the finding of the Reardon Committee:
There are reasons to question the validity of the Commit-
tee's data. The fifty-four defense attorneys who responded to
the survey constituted only twenty-seven percent of the 200
who received questionnaires - a very poor response rate that
makes generalization risky. Nor is it clear how representa-
tive the fifty-four were or whether they may have simply rep-
resented the most disgruntled of the lawyers surveyed. Three
respondents alone accounted for 186 of the 300 troublesome
cases mentioned. Further, defense attorneys would seem to
be an inherently biased source on whom to base a generaliza-
tion about the impact of prejudicial publicity - a possibility
made even more plausible by examination of the committee's
data from trial judges.
146. Walter Wilcox, The Press, the Jury, and the Behavioral Sciences, in FREE PRESS
AND FAIR TRIAL, supra note 142, at 63.
147. REARDON, supra note 144, at 22.
148. REARDON, supra note 144, at 22. See also HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 17 (1971) (stating that about 15% of all state felony cases proceed to
jury trial).
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Unfortunately, the Committee did not ask judges pre-
cisely the same questions as defense attorneys. The judges
were asked how often they had reprimanded the media about
reporting that occurred before or during trial. Thirty-nine
said never, only two said occasionally, and apparently the re-
mainder did not respond directly. Twenty-seven judges said
they occasionally requested reporters to withhold information
from publication. Of those twenty-seven, twenty-two re-
ported having generally or always received compliance and
only one reported having such requests refused. In other
words, the picture painted by the judges - the judicial actors
most likely to have an objective view of the situation - is far
less severe than that painted by defense attorneys.
The Committee's content analysis of newspapers is also
less than convincing since, as the Committee conceded, it did
not determine how many of the cases it considered actually
went to trial. Perhaps the best argument - and one made by
the Committee - is that the magnitude of the problem is
qualitative rather than quantitative. In other words, even if
the problem occurs in a relatively small number of situations,
these are precisely the cases that most severely test the fair-
ness of the judicial process. 149
Thus, the Reardon Committee took three positions on the scope of
the problem of prejudicial news coverage of criminal cases. First, it
recognized that the problem was relatively small in scope. Second, it
attempted to show that, although relatively small in scope, the prob-
lem still arose in enough cases to be problematic. But, its research
methods were inadequate to support that claim. Third, the Reardon
Committee contended that even if the problem were rare, the Commit-
tee was justified in recommending restrictions in order to assure fair-
ness in those infrequent cases in which the problem arose.
The studies indicating that there is no statistical variation in the
outcomes of cases receiving trial publicity compared to the outcomes of
cases receiving no publicity suggests that the Reardon Committee's
fears were not well-founded.150 Moreover, there is also anecdotal in-
formation that refutes the claim that publicity is likely to prevent a
defendant from getting a fair trial, even in highly charged cases. De-
fendants have prevailed in many high profile cases that have received
significant press coverage.
An early example of a defendant prevailing in spite of allegedly
prejudicial trial publicity is the treason case against Aaron Burr.' 5 '
149. Drechsel, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV., at 12-14.
150. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (1807).
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Despite the notoriety of the case Burr still managed to secure an
acquittal.
More recently, defendant John Hinckley, Jr. successfully raised
the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity at his trial for attempt-
ing to murder former President Ronald Reagan.152 Despite the mas-
sive amount of publicity generated by the shooting of the President
and his press secretary, James Brady, this did not prevent the jury
from accepting Hinckley's insanity defense. Additionally, the recent
acquittal of defendant William Kennedy Smith and the state court ac-
quittals of the police officers charged with beating Rodney King attest
to the fact that even massive amounts of publicity do not assure
conviction.
What accounts for the success of these defendants in the face of
massive trial publicity? Perhaps trial publicity does not have the det-
rimental impact we assume.. Perhaps trial publicity in high profile
cases can backfire against the prosecution if the evidence is not as
strong as the news accounts suggest. Even some criminal defense at-
torneys, who maintain that publicity is usually bad for defendants,
recognize that trial publicity can actually be helpful when the evi-
dence at trial is less harmful than what could be anticipated from ex-
tensive prior press coverage. 153
This anecdotal evidence does not prove that pretrial publicity in a
high profile case has no effect on trials, any more than anecdotal evi-
dence from cases like the Sheppard murder trial proves that pretrial
publicity is likely to prevent fair trials. These cases, along with the
studies establishing that there is no statistical difference between the
results of cases accompanied by publicity and cases that are not publi-
cized, show that the relationship between pretrial publicity and trial
outcomes is not readily predictable. In the absence of empirical data
establishing circumstances under which pretrial publicity is likely to
have an adverse impact on a trial, we should be skeptical about the
need for restrictive trial publicity rules that apply to all trials, or even
to all high profile trials.
The second study that supports the theory that prejudicial trial
publicity is a problem was made by the Medina Committee. At about
the same time that the Reardon Committee was conducting its re-
search, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York established
the Medina Commitee, a special committee on radio and television,
152. Stewart Taylor, Jr., Hinckley is Cleared But is Held Insane in Reagan Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1982, at Al; Laura A. Kiernan & Eric Pianin, Hinckley Found Not
Guilty, Insane, WASH. POST, June 22, 1982, at Al.
153. Andrew Blum, Trade Center Case Turns on Forensics, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 25, 1993,
at 8. The article stated that "there is the danger the prosecution may fail to deliver and
wind up helping the defense." Id.
[Vol. 28
HeinOnline  -- 28 Creighton L. Rev. 394 1994-1995
SILENCING LAWYERS
chaired by Judge Harold R. Medina. The research assistant for the
committee was a recent law school graduate.
The Medina Committee issued its report in 1965.154 This report,
like the report of the Reardon Committee, is of little value in assessing
the extent to which adverse publicity threatens fair trials. The report
is a compilation of incidents in which the broadcast media disclosed
information about crimes and criminal proceedings. The incidents oc-
curred in various cities around the country. In some cases, the de-
fendants entered guilty pleas to the charges. 155 In other cases, the
report did not state what happened in the criminal cases. 156 The Me-
dina Committee did not limit the incidents reported by time or place,
limits that would have enabled the Committee to establish the per-
centage of cases in the areas studied that may have been influenced by
pretrial publicity. The Committee made no attempt to determine
whether the defendants mentioned in the reported cases had jury tri-
als, whether they claimed any prejudice from the publicity, or even
whether the defendants ultimately were convicted. The report was
nothing more than a compilation of news reports in which reporters
disclosed some information about alleged crimes.
Despite the reports of the Reardon and Medina Committees, em-
pirical data on the issue of the extent of potentially prejudicial press
coverage confirms that the problem is exceedingly rare. The facts in
those cases in which trials have been tainted by press coverage can be
quite compelling, as the opinion in Sheppard v. Maxwell 157 demon-
strates. 158 But that should not blind us to the recognition that cases
like Sheppard are exceptional. The only reports that suggest that the
problem of trial publicity is not minimimal are the reports of the Rear-
don and Medina committees which were sponsored by the organized
bar. These reports contain such serious flaws that one cannot be confi-
dent about their conclusions. 159
B. THE IMPACT OF RESTRICTING ATTORNEY SPEECH BASED ON THE
POSSIBILITY OF PREJUDICIAL TRIAL PUBLICITY
Attorneys have little control over the amount or kind of publicity
generated by the cases they are trying. In criminal cases, the cases in
which claims of prejudicial trial publicity are most likely to be raised,
154. RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COMMIT-
TEE ON RADIO AND TELEVISION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK (Medina Committee 1965).
155. Id. at 32.
156. Id. at 4.
157. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
158. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-63 (1966).
159. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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there are many sources of information exclusive of attorneys that is
available to reporters. These sources include police and other law en-
forcement personnel, health care and emergency medical treatment
providers, coroners, and witnesses, as well as friends and relatives of
defendants and alleged victims. There is no logical reason to assume
that the amount of prejudicial information made available to reporters
would increase significantly if attorneys were permitted to speak to
reporters directly.
A review of articles about the highly publicized cases that periodi-
cally appear in the news confirms that attorneys have little impact on
the type and amount of information that is published in press reports.
At any given time, there will be one or two cases that receive wide-
spread notoriety. The articles about these cases invite readers to
make judgments about the parties involved. It is difficult to read news
reports about high profile cases without making an assessment about
the guilt of the persons involved. The reader's assessment of the par-
ties occurs despite current bar rules that prohibit attorneys from en-
gaging in trial publicity. Consider two of the more sensational cases
to be decided recently, the Lorena Bobbitt trial in Manassas, Virginia,
and the trial of the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas.
Lorena Bobbitt was charged with malicious wounding following
an incident in which she cut off her husband's penis with a kitchen
knife. She claimed that the attack was a response to years of spousal
abuse, including a rape the evening of the attack. Her case created
enormous publicity. A LEXIS search of news articles about the Bob-
bitt case discloses that more than one thousand articles were written
between the date of the incident in June, 1993 and the end of 1994.160
The publicity included much commentary by journalists as well as
news reporting about the case. 16 1 It is difficult to believe that the
amount of publicity surrounding this case could have been influenced
by whether Ms. Bobbitt's attorney chose to talk to reporters about the
matter. Clearly, the cause of the interest was the bizarre nature of
the attack and its relation to claims of spouse abuse. It is also inter-
esting that Ms. Bobbitt was not prejudiced by the inordinate amount
of press devoted to the case. The jury accepted her attorney's argu-
160. The NEXIS news library has more than one thousand documents about John
and Lorena Bobbitt during this time.
161. See Judy Mann, Beyond the Bobbitts'Battle, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1993, at E3;
Alice Kahn, The Bobbitts: Post-Freudian Sex Symbols?, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Oct. 27,
1993, at E7; Pete Dexter, Disturbing Message in Feminist Gesture, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 8, 1993, at A2.
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ment that the assault was the product of a brief psychotic breakdown,
and found her not guilty by reason of insanity.162
The Branch Davidian case arose as the result of a deadly confron-
tion between agents of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms ("A.T.F.") and members of the Branch Davidian religious
cult. In February, 1993 A.T.F. agents attempted to enter the Branch
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas to search for weapons. The leader
of the sect refused entry. During the standoff a gun battle broke out
leading to the death of four A.T.F. agents and six Branch Davidian
members. Numerous other persons on both sides were injured. Fol-
lowing the gun battle, A.T.F. laid siege to the compound. In April,
1993 the compound burned to the ground after federal agents
smashed holes in the building with an armored vehicle and pumped
tear gas in through the holes. 163
The United States prosecuted eleven members of the Branch
Davidians for numerous crimes including murder and conspiracy.
This case, as did the Bobbitt case, generated a great deal of publicity.
A LEXIS search disclosed more than one thousand news reports about
the case from the date of the first confrontation in February, 1993 to
the end of 1994.164 Many of these stories appeared during the siege of
the Branch Davidian headquarters, prior to the time that the defend-
ants had been charged with a crime and obtained counsel.165 Obvi-
ously, the publicity about this case came about because of the
spectacular events surrounding the deaths of the A.T.F. agents and
not because of the actions of the attorneys who represented the mem-
bers of the cult charged with the crimes. Also similar to the Bobbitt
case is the fact that publicity did not appear to prejudice the rights of
the defendants, who were acquitted of the most serious charges
brought against them, murder and conspiracy.166 Some of the defend-
ants were convicted of lesser offenses involving firearms violations. 16 7
The current case that has captured public attention is the murder
trial of O.J. Simpson. That case is pending as this article is being
written. Although Mr. Simpson's attorney, Robert Shapiro has ac-
162. Bill Miller & Marylou Tousignant, Bobbitt Acquitted in Attack on Husband;
Woman is Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanitiy, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1994, at Al.
163. J. Michael Kennedy, Waco Cultists Perish in Blaze, L.A. TIMES, April 20, 1993,
at Al.
164. More than one thousand documents exist in the NEXIS news library contain-
ing the terms "Branch Davidians" and "Koresh" (the leader of the sect was David
Koresh).
165. As of the publication of this article, the NEXIS news library contained 573 sto-
ries about the Branch Davidian confrontation published during the week after the gun
battle.
166. Sam Howe Verhovek, Eleven in Texas Sect Are Acquitted Of Key Charges, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, at Al.
167. Id.
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tively engaged in providing information to the press,1 68 there has been
a virtual mountain of information written and broadcast about the
case apart from the information provided by defense counsel. Again, it
is difficult to see how Mr. Shapiro's refusal to talk to the press would
have significantly reduced the press coverage of this case.
How can reporters write articles that invite judgments about the
guilt or innocence of defendants, despite bar rules prohibiting lawyers
from engaging in trial publicity? Either lawyers are violating trial
publicity restrictions with impunity, or reporters are gathering suffi-
cient information to write detailed articles about criminal cases in the
absence of the assistance of lawyers. One study indicates that it is
unlikely that lawyers are or could be an important source of informa-
tion for reporters trying to gather material for a story about a crime.
A study of news reporting about felonies in Detroit disclosed the fact
that sixty percent of the stories were reported at the time of the com-
mission of the crime, during the investigation, or at the time of
arrest. 16 9 At these stages, it is unlikely that a suspect would have an
attorney, let alone that the attorney would have much information to
tell a reporter about the alleged crime. Reporters are perfectly capa-
ble of preparing news items about criminal conduct early in a criminal
case and without the assistance of members of the bar.
The cases that are most likely to be the subject of extensive pub-
licity are cases in which there is "a note of the extraordinary, the bi-
zarre, the especially frightening, or the humorous - or, to get down to
it, the interesting."170 These extraordinary cases are exactly the
kinds of cases in which reporters are likely to be able to dig up infor-
mation whether or not they are able to talk to lawyers.
If lawyers are but one source of the information that may preju-
dice a jury in the course of a trial, then a restriction on trial publicity
that is limited to lawyers cannot be effective in preventing prejudice.
A more effective rule would reach beyond lawyers and cover reporters
directly, thus barring the publication of prejudicial information no
matter who provided the information. The United States Supreme
Court, however, has taken a dim view of attempts to reduce press cov-
erage by placing restrictions on the media.
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court established that states
cannot hold members of the media in contempt of court for criticizing
judges about pending matters, absent proof that the criticism raised a
168. Jim Newton and Shawn Hubler, Simpson Held After Wild Chase, L.A. TIMES,
June 18, 1994, at Al.
169. George Hough III, Felonies, Jury Trials, and News Reports, in FREE PRESS AND
FAIR TRIAL, supra note 142, at 39.
170. FRIENDLY & GOLDFARM, supra note 135, at 61-66.
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clear and present danger to the administration of justice. In Bridges
v. California,171 the Court reversed a finding of contempt against the
Los Angeles Times.172 The Los Angeles Times had published an edito-
rial which criticized a judge for considering sentencing two men to
probation after they had been convicted in criminal trials.173
In Pennekamp v. Florida,174 the Court reversed a finding of con-
tempt against a newspaper and its publisher for criticizing state court
judges about their treatment of defendants in pending cases.' 7 5 The
Court accepted the findings of the Florida court that the newspaper
did not publish the full truth about pending matters; that the paper
did not state objectively the attitude of the state judges; that the ac-
tions taken by the judges were required under state law; that the
newspaper willfully, wantonly, or recklessly withheld the truth from
the public; and that the motive of the newspaper was to destroy the
efficiency of the courts.' 7 6
Despite accepting these findings, the Court held that the State of
Florida violated the United States Constitution's First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press by holding the newspaper and its
publisher in contempt. The State could not find the parties in con-
tempt in the absence of proof that the editorials had created a clear
and present danger to the fair administration of justice.' 77
In Craig v. Harney,178 the Court reversed a state court decision
holding representatives of a newspaper in contempt of court for re-
ports published about a pending legal matter. 179 Neither inaccuracies
in reporting nor strong, intemperate, and unfair criticism of the trial
judge sufficed to convince the Court that the newspaper had created
an imminent and serious threat to the ability of the court to adminis-
ter justice fairly.' 80 The imminent threat to justice standard is the
standard required by the Court to justify a trial court taking action
against a newspaper in response to published articles about a trial.
The Supreme Court has also refused to permit states to issue gag
orders prohibiting the media from reporting about pending cases. In
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,'8 l the Court overturned a gag order
issued by a judge prior to a murder trial barring the news media from
171. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
172. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-73 (1941).
173. Id. at 271-72.
174. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
175. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 333, 350 (1946).
176. Id. at 344-45.
177. Id. at 348.
178. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
179. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1947).
180. Id.
181. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions
made by defendant.'5 2 While not absolutely foreclosing the possibility
of such orders restraining the press in the future, the Court held that
there is a presumption against the validity of such orders, and the
party seeking to restrain the press bears a heavy burden of justifying
the need for the restraint.' 83
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,'8 4 the Court held
that the First Amendment barred the State of Virginia from imposing
a criminal sanction against a newspaper that disclosed the confiden-
tial proceedings of a judicial review commission's investigation of com-
plaints about a state judge.'8 5 Whatever interest Virginia had in
preserving the confidentiality of the commission's investigations of
judges, this interest could not outweigh the First Amendment right of
the newspaper to report about those investigations.
The Court also has rejected attempts by states to prevent the
press from disclosing the names of minors involved in juvenile court
proceedings.' 8 6 These cases demonstrate the unwillingness of the
Court to permit states to interfere with the right of the news media to
report on legal proceedings.
If the state may not directly bar the press from reporting on mat-
ters taking place in court, can the state bar the public from attending
court proceedings in order to avoid publication of information? The
Court has refused to permit judges to close court proceedings for this
purpose.' 8 7
The Court also has refused to permit trial courts to punish public
officials or interested parties, other than attorneys, for criticizing
judges publicly about pending matters. In Wood v. Georgia,l88 the
Court reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals decision holding a sheriff
in contempt of court for publicly criticizing State judges for impanel-
ling a grand jury to investigate bloc voting patterns by African-Ameri-
182. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
183. Id.
184. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
185. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 833-34 (1978).
186. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
187. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603-06 (1982) (hold-
ing that a trial judge cannot close trial during testimony of juvenile); Press Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510-13 (1984) (holding that the trial court could not con-
stitutionally close voir dire to protect privacy interests of prospective jurors without
considering alternatives to closure and without articulating findings to support the
broad order); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558, 581 (1980)
(holding that the public and the press have a Constitutional right to attend criminal
trials).
188. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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can voters. 189 The State of Gerogia charged that the sheriff's
criticism amounted to an attempt to obstruct and to interfere with the
grand jury investigation, that the criticism "imputed a lack of judicial
integrity" to the judges who impanelled the grand jury, and that the
criticism created a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice.190
The Court rejected the allegation that the sheriff's criticism cre-
ated a clear and present danger to the administration ofjustice. In his
opinion, Chief Justice Earl Warren reviewed the facts and found no
such danger; the Court was particularly skeptical of the charges
against the public official in view of the fact that the case involved a
grand jury investigation, rather than a trial in which the rights of a
party were at stake. 19 1 The Court held that the state court's actions
violated the sheriff's rights under the First Amendment.
19 2
In Bridges v. California,193 an officer of a union that was involved
in a representation dispute sent a telegram to the Secretary of Labor
in which he threatened that his union would strike if a judge recog-
nized a rival union in a case pending before that judge. 194 The union
officer caused or acquiesced in the publication of the telegram in news-
papers. 195 The California Supreme Court had held the union in con-
tempt of court on the ground that the union's actions tended to
interfere with the fair and orderly administration of justice in a pend-
ing case. 19 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed the California
Court's decision finding it to be unconstitutional. 19 7 The Supreme
Court rejected the contention that the union's telegram constituted an
attempt to intimidate the trial judge.198
The Wood and Bridges cases do not reject the proposition that
trial courts can prohibit interested parties from speaking about indi-
vidual cases in appropriate circumstances. These cases make clear
that the Court will look closely at the facts of each case to determine
whether an attempt to punish criticism of a trial court is justified.
The cases also make clear that a state court must meet a heavy bur-
den to justify punishing a person who publishes critical remarks.
Thus far we have seen that the problem of prejudicial trial public-
ity arises in a very small percentage of cases that come to trial. Law-
189. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386-87, 395 (1962).
190. Id. at 380-87.
191. Id. at 389.
192. Id. at 385.
193. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
194. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 275-77.
195. Id. at 276.
196. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.2d 464, 488 (Cal. 1939).
197. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 258-59, 278.
198. Id. at 278.
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yers are but one source of the many sources of information published
by the news media about trials. The Court has rejected attempts to
restrict trial publicity by punishing public officials or other interested
parties who have made public comments about pending cases. The
Court also has rejected direct methods of restricting the press from
either gaining access to information at court proceedings or publishing
information about trials. In sum, trial publicity by attorneys is a very
small part of a very small problem. Attempts to solve this problem by
gagging lawyers are doomed to fail because of the many other sources
of information available to the media. Attempts to solve the problem
by gagging the press or other interested parties are also doomed to fail
because the First Amendment to the Constitution will not tolerate
such restraints on speech except in very narrow circumstances.
There is yet another reason to reject the notion that a broad rule
restricting attorneys from disclosing information about trials is a rea-
sonable solution to the problem of prejudicial trial publicity. Rules
that restrict lawyers from talking to reporters prevent attorneys from
balancing prejudicial information provided to the press by other
sources. The press may report false or misleading information pro-
vided to the media by police, witnesses, and other parties not subject
to regulation by the organized bar. Permitting lawyers to talk to the
press may reduce prejudicial trial publicity in these cases. There are
no studies that have tested this thesis, but there are cases that pro-
vide stark evidence of the value of permitting lawyers to respond to
adverse publicity. e9 9 Consider the following two examples.
Ironically, the first example occurred in a suburb of Cleveland,
Ohio, as did the Sam Sheppard case, and shares other similarities
with that case. At approximately 12:30 a.m. on the morning of Sep-
tember 14, 1990, sixteen-year-old Lisa Pruett was stabbed to death in
Shaker Heights, Ohio. The police focused their investigation on Kevin
Young, a Shaker Heights resident who was the son of a prominent
Cleveland attorney.
The Pruett murder case had all the elements of a sensational
crime. The victim was a young woman who lived in a quiet suburban
community. The accused came from a wealthy, prominent family.
The investigators had a difficult time finding physical evidence to link
the accused to the crime, causing the investigation to stretch out and
the news stories to pile up while the public debated whether Young
had committed the crime and whether the wealth of his family was
protecting him from a prosecution that a less-privileged person would
have had to endure.
199. Max D. Stern, The Right of the Accused to a Public Defense, 18 HAIv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 53 (1983) (noting a powerful example of the value of defense publicity).
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During the investigation, a Cleveland newspaper printed a story
about the case that contained the following statements:
The main suspect in the unsolved slaying of Shaker
Heights resident Lisa Pruett had threatened to kill the 16-
year-old and was seen near the site of the killing 90 minutes
before it happened, according to an affidavit for a search war-
rant unsealed yesterday at the request of The Plain Dealer.
Kevin Young, 19, of Shaker Heights also knew details of
the killing known only to investigators, the affidavit says.
Young was seen "walking towards South Woodland Rd., the
scene of the homicide, at approximately 11 p.m. Sept. 13,
1990," the affidavit says.
Pruett's partially clothed body was found by Shaker
Heights police in the back yard of a house at 16401 S. Wood-
land Rd. about 1:05 a.m, a half-hour after they had responded
to a report of a woman screaming at S. Woodland and Lee
Rds. Police had been unable to find anyone at that time and
left.200
The article contained a substantial amount of information that
implicated Young in Pruett's murder. The following day the newspa-
per printed another article, one that included comments by Young's
attorney relating to the previous day's story. The article stated:
The lawyer for the lead suspect in the unsolved slaying of
16-year-old Shaker Heights resident Lisa Pruett reacted an-
grily yesterday to a search warrant affidavit that said his cli-
ent threatened to murder Pruett and was seen near the site of
the killing 90 minutes before it happened.
Lawyer Mark DeVan demanded that police release the
results of laboratory tests that he said would clear his client,
Kevin Young.
"It is clear that the hard evidence is non-existent in
terms of his involvement with this matter," DeVan said. "Of
course, he was seen at 11 p.m. in the area of the murder, but
it has no bearing since he lives in the neighborhood and was
home by 11:10 p.m., nearly an hour and a half before the
homicide."
"My client was home from 11:10 p.m. throughout the
night," DeVan said. "The police were told this by my client's
father. They were told this by his mother and by the client
himself. I invited the police to interview (them) and to in-
spect the house and see how it was impossible for him to
leave without his parents knowing. His mother offered to
200. Christopher Evans, Pruett Affidavit Unsealed Tells of Suspect's Threats, Sight-
ing, CLEv. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 2, 1991, at 1A.
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 28 Creighton L. Rev. 403 1994-1995
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
take a polygraph in regards to her statement about his alibi.
The Shaker police have ignored my invitation and her offer."
In the affidavit, the police said Young knew facts about
the killing known only to investigators.
"The police claim that he said that she had not been
raped, and therefore, he had knowledge that only the killer
would know," DeVan said. "However, early on the morning of
the murder, there was a general conversation in the commu-
nity as well as a media broadcast that she had not been sexu-
ally assaulted. So the police have their facts in error."
DeVan denied that Young carried a switchblade, as po-
lice stated in the affidavit. He said most of the statements
police made about Young were based on "third-hand, out-of-
context statements which were coffeehouse conversations a
month before the killing. They are inaccurate."201
Young's attorney, Mark DeVan, performed a valuable service for
his client by responding to the adverse statements about the client as
soon as they appeared in the newspaper. His response diminished any
prejudicial effect of the information provided by the police officers in-
vestigating the case. The effect of the response was to make it more
likely that Young could receive a fair trial by an impartial jury in the
Cleveland community.
The history of the case bears this out. The trial judge denied a
motion by Young's attorney seeking a change of venue for the trial.20 2
The trial resulted in a jury verdict of acquittal.20 3
There are several points worth noting about this case that bear
directly on the issue of whether the bar should prohibit attorneys from
speaking publicly on behalf of their clients. First, it is difficult to see
how any rules or laws that could withstand a constitutional challenge
could have prevented the initial article quoted above. As we have
seen, the Supreme Court has struck down prohibitions against news-
papers reporting news about criminal matters.20 4 The Court also has
barred attempts to muzzle law enforcement personnel who speak out
about pending cases.20 5
Second, it would not have been in the public interest for the police
to have avoided providing information about the case. The Pruett
murder caused a sensation in the Shaker Heights community. People
201. Christopher Evans, Lawyer Disputes Police Account of Pruett Case, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 3, 1991, at lB.
202. James F. McCarty, Shaker Murder Trial to Begin Tomorrow, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, June 20, 1993, at lB.
203. James F. McCarty, Young Acquitted in Pruett Killing, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER,
July 22, 1993, at 1A.
204. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
205. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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criticized the police throughout the investigation either for protecting
Young because of his father's prominence or for focusing the investiga-
tion on Young in the absence of any direct evidence linking him to the
crime. In that atmosphere, the police had little choice but to present
the information they had to the public and to defend the way they
handled the investigation. Silence likely would have encouraged the
rumor mill and increased the attacks on the police investigation. 206
Third, the specific information that gave rise to the article in the
Young case came from an affidavit prepared by the prosecutors in sup-
port of a request for a search warrant. Both the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
permit an attorney to state information contained in the public record
of a case. 20 7 Under these exceptions, an attorney can skirt restric-
tions on trial publicity by inserting in briefs, pleadings, and other
court documents information about the case that is primarily intended
for public consumption rather than for the court. While there is no
evidence that the prosecution in the Young case deliberately included
adverse information about the defendant in the affidavit in order to
publicize that information, it is quite apparent that any attorney seek-
ing to publicize information about a case could do so by filing docu-
ments containing adverse information. 208
The information provided by the police to the public, while impor-
tant for the community, put Young in a precarious position. If DeVan
had chosen not to respond to the statements in the paper, his ability to
defend Young in court would have been compromised. But no compe-
tent attorney would have permitted Young to call a press conference to
respond personally to the charges. There is too great a risk that
through error, nervousness, or lack of skill in dealing with the media,
the client would have made a statement that could have been used to
his disadvantage at trial. Perhaps the Young family could have hired
a public relations firm to present Young's position, but that is hardly a
realistic possibility in most criminal cases, and probably would not
have been helpful to the accused in this case. Doing so would have
provided fuel for those who charged that Young's parents were able to
secure preferred treatment for their son by dint of their wealth and
prominence.
206. Grant Segall, Prosecutor Waits on FBI for Tests in Girl's Slaying, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 1, 1991, at 3B.
207. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107(C)(9) & DR 7-
107(D) (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6(c)(2) (1989).
208. See GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALo CREEK DISASTER 104-16 (1976) (stating
that the plaintiffs' attorney filed two telephone book-sized volumes of information with
the court and made the material available to a newspaper reporter interested in the
case).
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In this case, as in most cases, the one person who had the relevant
information and the skill with which to present that information for
the benefit of the accused was defense counsel. It is absurd to have a
system in which public officials, such as police officers, may make pub-
lic statements about criminal investigations, while at the same time,
bar disciplinary rules prevent the person most capable of speaking ef-
fectively on behalf of the defendant from doing so. Muzzling the attor-
ney in these cases does not prevent prejudicial publicity, it prevents
the defendant from being able to respond to the prejudicial publicity.
The rule maximizes the harm that arises when the media broadcasts
prejudicial information about a pending case.
The second case bearing on the adverse consequences of rules re-
stricting attorneys from speaking about pending matters is a case that
came before the United States Supreme Court. In Gentile v. State Bar
of Nevada,20 9 the Supreme Court heard an appeal from an attorney
who was disciplined by the Nevada State Bar for holding a press con-
ference to respond to charges leveled against his client by Nevada po-
lice officers. 210
The Las Vegas Police Department charged Gentile's client, Grady
Sanders, the owner of Western Vault Corporation, with stealing drugs
and money that the police department had stored at Western
Vault.211 The police first reported the theft in January of 1987. Gen-
tile's client was indicted in February of 1988.212 In the interim, the
media in Las Vegas reported a number of stories about the theft,
many containing police statements that reflected adversely on Gen-
tile's client.
When Sanders was indicted, Gentile held a press conference
charging that the party most likely responsible for the theft from the
vault was a police officer who had access to the vault. Gentile asserted
his client's innocence and claimed that the police were covering up cor-
ruption in the department. He compared the case to cases in other
cities in which police officers had been indicted for illegal, corrupt con-
duct. Gentile urged the Nevada Police Department to follow the ex-
ample of the enlightened departments in other cities.213
Gentile held this press conference to counter prejudicial publicity
presented against his client and to overcome efforts that he believed
were taken by law enforcement officials to poison the prospective pool
of jurors. Apparently Gentile's efforts were successful. Grady Sand-
209. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
210. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991).
211. Id. at 1039-40.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1037.
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ers had a jury trial six months after the press conference, and the jury
acquitted him on all counts.2
14
The Gentile case is similar to the Young case. Gentile had seen
newspaper reports that were highly prejudicial to his client. Those
reports could have made it difficult for his client to get a fair trial
before an impartial jury. The attorney provided information to the
press to counteract the adverse publicity about his client. In so doing,
he made it more likely that his client could obtain a fair trial.
The Nevada State Bar disciplined Gentile for making a public
statement about his client's criminal case in violation of a Nevada
Supreme Court Rule.2 15 The rule was virtually identical to the trial
publicity restrictions set forth in Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. 2 16 The United States Supreme Court, in a five to four
decision, held that the Nevada State Bar could not discipline the attor-
ney for his comments, because the rule under which he was disci-
plined was too vague to inform the attorney what information could
and could not be disclosed to the public by the attorney.2 17 Turning to
the second issue of the case, Chief Justice William Rehnquist deliv-
ered a five to four opinion declaring that the standard by which to
assess the constitutionality of a rule barring an attorney from public
comment about a case is whether the rule protects against the sub-
stantial likelihood that the comment would materially prejudice the
trial of the client.2 1 8
The Young and Gentile cases by themselves do not establish a
need to permit attorneys to talk about cases publicly any more than
the Sheppard case by itself could justify rules prohibiting attorneys
from talking. These cases are important because they represent cases
that have received widespread press coverage. Consider any of the
infamous cases of the past several years, the Mike Tyson rape case,
the William Kennedy Smith trial, the Rodney King. trials, the O.J.
Simpson case, or any other court case of similar notoriety. Is there
one case that has had less publicity adverse to the defendant because
the current codes establishing standards of conduct for the legal pro-
fession bar attorneys from responding to public accusations against
their clients? Is there one in which the defendant's position was en-
hanced because the attorneys could not respond to allegations,
whether true or not, broadcast by the media? In a high profile case,
the defendant's position is no worse, and, in fact, may be much im-
proved if defense counsel is willing and able, as were Young's and
214. Id. at 1033.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1048-51.
218. Id. at 1062-63.
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Sanders' counsel, to respond to adverse statements in a timely fash-
ion. Muzzling attorneys not only does little to reduce the problem of
prejudicial pretrial publicity but, in some cases, actually exacerbates
the problem.
C. SOLUTIONS FOR PROTECTING PARTIES FROM THE ADVERSE
EFFECTS OF PREJUDICIAL TRIAL PUBLICITY
Whatever else may be said about trial publicity, it is clear that
there will be some cases in which the amount and type of publicity will
threaten the ability of the parties to obtain a fair trial before an im-
partial jury. Courts have a number of tools available to minimize the
risk that news stories will prevent fair trials, even in high publicity
cases. These tools include closely questioning potential jurors about
prejudice during voir dire, sequestering the jury, granting a continu-
ance to allow the effect of adverse publicity to dissipate, granting a
change of venue to a place where the defendant is less likely to be
affected adversely by news reports, instructing the jurors to avoid
press reports about the trial and to avoid consideration of any infor-
mation about the case other than what has been presented in court,
and setting aside a verdict when evidence is presented that the jury's
decision was tainted by prejudicial news reports. In an extreme set of
circumstances, the trial judge may issue gag orders prohibiting per-
sons who have an interest in the litigation, including attorneys, from
discussing the case with outside parties including representatives of
the media.
To be sure, there may be problems with some of the individual
techniques employed to assure impartial juries. Commentators do not
agree on the effectiveness of voir dire in preventing prejudiced jurors
from being seated. 219 Sequestering the jury, granting a continuance,
or granting a change of venue can be costly and inconvenient. In-
structing the jurors to avoid press reports about the trial and to avoid
consideration of any information about the case other than what has
been presented in court relies on the good faith of the jurors for en-
forcement. However, it is also true that the jury enterprise generally
relies on the good faith of jurors and their willingness to follow in-
structions. Setting aside a verdict when evidence is presented that
the jury's decision was tainted by prejudicial news reports is not only
time consuming and costly, but is unlikely to be a realistic possibility
219. Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L.
REv. 503, 505 (1965) (stating that voir dire is grossly ineffective at weeding out unfavor-
able jurors or eliciting data on which jurors were likely to be unfavorable); Alice M
Padawer-Singer et al., Voir Dire By Two Lawyers: An Essential Safeguard, JUDICATURE
386, 389 (1974) (stating that voir dire by trial counsel can reduce prejudice caused by
pretrial publicity).
[Vol. 28
HeinOnline  -- 28 Creighton L. Rev. 408 1994-1995
SILENCING LAWYERS
in all but a handful of cases because of the difficulties of proof. For
example, in Mu'Min v. Virginia,220 the Supreme Court held that the
trial court sitting in the location of the controversey was in the best
position to determine the depth and extent of the potential injury.221
As such, the trial court would enjoy great latitude to determine
whether or not a fair trial was jeopardized.222
These procedures for reducing prejudice from trial publicity are
inconvenient, and may be costly and time consuming as well. But, we
have seen that the incidence of prejudicial press coverage is rare.22 3
We have also seen that restricting attorneys from providing informa-
tion about cases in litigation can have little effect on the incidence of
prejudicial publicity. 224 Because the problem is rare, it is not exces-
sively costly to the judicial system to rely on these techniques to over-
come prejudicial trial publicity. Because blanket restrictions on
attorneys have no impact on the amount of prejudicial publicity gener-
ated by non-lawyers, it is likely that the traditional techniques for re-
ducing the effects of prejudice will have to be the primary techniques
for dealing with the problem in any event.
A court imposed gag order prohibiting persons interested in a
matter in litigation from discussing the case in public can be an effec-
tive means of reducing the likelihood of trial publicity interfering with
the right of litigants to a fair trial. Such an order restricts the right of
the gagged persons to speak. If a gag order were improperly imposed,
the order could violate the First Amendment rights of the parties as
severely as a blanket rule prohibiting attorneys from engaging in trial
publicity. There are several factors, however, that make the imposi-
tion of a gag order in an individual case a less threatening and more
appropriate method of insuring a fair trial than a rule generally limit-
ing attorneys from talking about matters in litigation.
First, individual gag orders would be limited to those few cases in
which trial publicity is likely to be a problem. Attorneys would be free
in other cases to advocate in public on behalf of their clients without
the threat of adverse bar disciplinary action.
Second, a gag order could be tailored to the particular needs of a
specific case. If a trial judge determined that certain information was
likely to prejudice the rights of a party, the judge could limit the re-
striction to that information while permitting the parties to discuss
other less sensitive matters. If the judge determined that the gag or-
220. 500 U.S. 415 (1991).
221. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991).
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
224. See supra § V.B.
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der should restrict persons having information about the case other
than lawyers, the order could so specify.
Third, a trial judge would have to take affirmative action to im-
pose a gag order. Bar rules that prohibit lawyers from making public
comments about matters in litigation are based on the assumption
that such comments inevitably will interfere with the right of the par-
ties to receive a fair trial. The Gentile and Young cases make clear
that in some circumstances this assumption will not be true. When
the propriety of a restriction on speech depends upon particular cir-
cumstances, a state should be required to take affirmative action to
show that those circumstances exist. First Amendment doctrine gen-
erally prohibits a state from imposing rules restricting speech that are
broader than necessary to resolve the problem for which the rules
were imposed. 22 5
Fourth, the effect of an improper gag order is less destructive of
First Amendment values than is the effect of a general rule prohibit-
ing speech. If a judge were to issue a gag order that did not comply
with the requirements of the Constitution, the violation would be lim-
ited to the particular case in which the order was issued. The effect of
a general restriction on trial publicity by attorneys is to inhibit trial
lawyers from exercising constitutionally protected rights in the vast
number of cases in which trial publicity does not threaten the fairness
of the trials.
Fifth, in order to impose a gag order in an individual case, the
party seeking the order would have to introduce evidence to support
the need for a restriction on the right of the parties to speak. Justifi-
cation for the order would be based on a factual record. A party oppos-
ing the order would have an opportunity to dispute the claim that
conditions in the community required a restriction on speech in order
to assure a fair trial. The necessity for the order, when contested,
would be subject to the traditional adversary procedure. The proce-
dure would result in the creation of a record for review on appeal.
Consequently, an appellate court could establish whether a gag order
was necessary based upon a legitimate factual record, rather than
upon speculative rhetorical arguments.
225. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1989) (holding that a statute
prohibiting flag desecration was not necessary to prevent breach of peace); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) (holding that a statute prohibiting people from carrying
signs critical of a government near the government's embassy is not narrowly drawn to
protect the dignity of foreign diplomats).
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D. THE COURTS AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRIAL PUBLICITY BY
ATTORNEYS
The Supreme Court has decided considerably fewer cases dealing
with the constitutionality of rules restricting attorneys from engaging
in trial publicity about pending cases than about restrictions on attor-
ney advertising. An early attempt by the Court to deal with this issue
came in 1959 in the case of In re Sawyer.226 Ms. Sawyer was an attor-
ney in Hawaii who was representing defendants in a criminal case.
The defendants were on trial for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act.
While the trial was pending, Sawyer spoke at a meeting sponsored by
a labor union. Several members of the union were defendants in the
criminal case. During the course of her talk, Sawyer criticized prose-
cutions under the Smith Act in general and the prosecution of the case
being tried in Hawaii in particular. The Hawaii Bar Association
charged the lawyer with violating the Canons of Professional Ethics
for her comments in that speech, and the Hawaii Supreme Court ulti-
mately disciplined her for her remarks. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision to discipline Sawyer.
Justice William Brennan, who wrote the majority decision in In re
Sawyer, had a significantly different view about the facts than did
Justice Felix Frankfurter, who wrote the dissent. Justice Brennan
viewed the disciplinary case as a charge that Sawyer had attacked the
impartiality and fairness of the trial judge in the Smith Act case.
Finding no support for the charge in Sawyer's remarks, the Court re-
versed the disciplinary action without reaching the question of
whether the First Amendment prevented the Hawaii bar from disci-
plining the attorney.227
Justice Frankfurter, writing on behalf of four Justices, viewed the
case as a charge that the lawyer had "engaged in a willful attack on
the administration of justice in the particular trial in which she was
then actively participating, and patently impugned, even if by clear
implication rather than by blatant words, the integrity of the presid-
ing judge."228 Under this view of the facts, the case tested whether
the First Amendment protected the attorney from making comments
that could have had an effect on the integrity of the trial then taking
place.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion construed the remarks given
by Sawyer as critical comment about Smith Act prosecutions and con-
spiracy trials, using the Hawaii trial as a particular example. 229 He
226. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
227. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 626-27 (1959).
228. Id. at 652 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 632-33.
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read the record very narrowly to avoid a direct constitutional confron-
tation between the First Amendment and the obligation of a trial at-
torney in assuring a fair trial. Justice Brennan also expressed a
tolerant attitude toward attorneys who criticize judges about pending
matters:
If Judge Wiig was said to be wrong on his law, it is no
matter; appellate courts and law reviews say that of judges
daily, and it imputes no disgrace. Dissenting opinions in our
reports are apt to make petitioner's speech look like tame
stuff indeed. Petitioner did not say Judge Wiig was corrupt
or venal or stupid or incompetent. The public attribution of
honest error to the judiciary is no cause for professional disci-
pline in this country. 23 0
Justice Potter Stewart filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with
the majority that the Hawaii State Bar had not disciplined Sawyer for
obstructing or prejudicing the administration of justice. Justice Stew-
art agreed that that First Amendment issue was not properly before
the Court.23 1 But, Justice Stewart also made clear that if the State
Bar had disciplined Sawyer for that reason, he would have been will-
ing to permit the disciplinary action, despite the constitutional argu-
ments raised on her behalf. Justice Stewart wrote in his concurring
opinion "[o]bedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from
what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected
speech." 23 2
Justice Frankfurter, deciding that Sawyer had interfered with the
fair administration of justice, would have sustained the disciplinary
action. He expressed an attitude that was particularly sympathetic to
the notion that the bar should protect judges from critical comment by
trial attorneys:
Even under the most favoring circumstances - an able,
fearless, and fastidiously impartial judge, competent and
scrupulous lawyers, a befittingly austere court-room atmos-
phere - trial by jury of a criminal case where public feeling
is deeply engaged is no easy accomplishment, as every exper-
ienced lawyer knows, if due regard is to be had to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution for such a trial. It is difficult
enough to seal the court-room, as it were, against outside
pressures. The delicate scales of justice ought not to be will-
fully agitated from without by any of the participants respon-
sible for the fair conduct of the trial.23 3
230. Id. at 635.
231. Id. at 646 (Stewart, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
233. Id. at 667 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Justices Frankfurter and Brennan had significantly different atti-
tudes about the plight of judges faced with criticism of their conduct
on pending legal matters. If Justice Brennan expected judges to face
up to criticism as part of the job of judging, Justice Frankfurter
seemed to suggest that judges could not perform their duties without
insulation from the criticism.
The debate among the Justices about the effect on judges of per-
mitting critical comment by attorneys in the course of litigation was a
peculiar one. It avoided any recognition of the essentially political na-
ture of the legal system. There was no recognition that, under the
Constitution, the judiciary is the third branch of government.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion treated judges as scientists who
must be free to conduct their experiments in an hermetically sealed
laboratory, lest the outside world contaminate the process and destroy
the results. It is doubtful that anyone, other than judges and lawyers,
could discuss the prosecution of labor leaders for conspiracy to spread
the "Communist menace" in the United States without admitting that
what was taking place was a political act.
Court decisions are products of their times. The criminal case
that gave rise to the charges of misconduct by attorney Sawyer was a
case in which the United States was prosecuting union members for
engaging in a conspiracy in violation of the Smith Act.234 The Smith
Act made it unlawful for persons to advocate the violent overthrow of
the government. 235 The criminal cases involving alleged Communists
that arose during the 1950s in the height of McCarthyism is a product
of the political climate of that time.236 Court decisions in Smith Act
cases reflect that political climate. 237 To assume that judges somehow
render legal decisions without being influenced by events that are tak-
ing place outside the courtroom is arrogant. To assume that judges
can avoid being influenced by the events of the day, but cannot avoid
being influenced by the criticism of attorneys is misguided.
The fractured Court in Sawyer does not provide us with guidance
about the limits a state may impose on a lawyer's right to speak publi-
cally while representing parties at a trial. But, the decision in Sawyer
does parallel some of the features of Court decisions in the advertising
cases. The decision reveals a divided Court whose members held
strongly divergent views about the role of attorneys in the legal sys-
tem. Just as Justice O'Connor suggested that Constitutional consider-
234. Id. at 627.
235. 18 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1946) (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
236. See VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES (1980) (reviewing the climate of the
McCarthy era).
237. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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ations may be subordinated to ethical norms when determining the
rights of attorneys to advertise, 238 Justices Stewart and Frankfurter
argued that the First Amendment rights of attorneys must bow to eth-
ical norms when determining the right of attorneys to speak out about
pending legal matters.
Just as the Court has failed to compel members of the organized
bar to provide empirical support for their claims about the evils of law-
yer advertising, so did the Court fail to demand data to support claims
by the bar that criticism of a judge by an attorney representing parties
in trial would interfere with the ability of the judge to conduct a fair
trial. The Court did not even discuss the outcome of the criminal case
that gave rise to the charges against Sawyer, let alone discuss how her
comments may have made the conduct of that case more difficult.
And, as in the advertising cases, despite the failure of the Court to
issue a ringing endorsement for free speech by attorneys engaged in
litigation, the decision overturned the attempt by the Hawaii State
Bar to discipline the lawyer for her actions.
The second case decided by the Supreme Court dealing with trial
publicity by attorneys was the previously discussed case of Gentile v.
State Bar of Nevada.239 Unlike Sawyer, the attorney in Gentile at-
tacked neither the conduct of the trial judge, the statute giving rise to
the criminal charges, nor the fairness of the procedures in the case
giving rise to his comments. Gentile attacked the conduct of the police
in bringing charges against his client, Grady Sanders, despite evi-
dence that police officers rather than Sanders had committed the
crimes.
In Gentile, the Court established a standard for determining the
propriety of trial publicity by lawyers. The Court held that a state
may discipline an attorney for engaging in trial publicity that creates
a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the administration of
justice.240 It is not clear at this point what effect this standard will
have in future cases. The Gentile case was decided by a five to four
vote on the issue of the standard to be used in determining when a
state can discipline an attorney for speaking about a matter in trial. A
second decision, by a five to four vote, held that Nevada could not dis-
cipline Gentile for his remarks because the disciplinary rule under
which the attorney was disciplined was void for vagueness. Adding to
the problem of anticipating the future effect of the Gentile decision is
the fact that the Supreme Court did not advise states what informa-
238. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 626-27.
239. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
240. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991).
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tion they would have to provide to establish whether an attorney's
comments had created a substantial likelihood of material prejudice.
Much like the advertising cases and the prior decision in Sawyer,
the split result in Gentile appears to be a reflection of the attitude of
the justices about how the legal profession should present itself to the
public rather than a decision based on evidence about what goes on in
the world outside the Supreme Court when an attorney speaks. The
decision by the Court did not focus on the fact that Gentile's client was
not denied a fair trial because of the attorney's remarks. It did not
consider that the attorney was responding to a great deal of adverse
publicity that would have gone unchallenged had Gentile not spoken.
The decision did not deal with the fact that absent response by Gentile
there would have been no practical way for his client, Sanders, to over-
come the negative publicity against him advanced by the police state-
ments. In short, the decision failed to recognize that Gentile's conduct
was a service to the administration of justice, making it more likely
rather than less likely that Grady Sanders could receive a fair trial.
As in previous cases, the decision in Gentile prevented a state
from disciplining an attorney for exercising rights protected by the
First Amendment, while failing to demand that the organized bar pro-
vide evidence other than legal rhetoric to support the need for disci-
pline. In so doing, the decision invites the bar to continue to try to
muzzle attorneys and to come before the Court in future cases so that
the Justices can continue to fight with each other over abstract no-
tions about the need to restrict attorneys from speaking in order to
preserve the integrity of the legal system.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both advertising rules and trial publicity rules show the penchant
of the bar for dealing with sensitive problems by prohibiting lawyers
from speaking. This is a dangerous game that rarely serves the public
interest.
Despite evidence that advertising by lawyers reduces the cost of
legal services to the public without reducing the quality of services,
bar disciplinary agencies continue to argue that they should have the
right to restrict advertising severely. The basis for the argument is an
abstract claim that some concept of professionalism is being harmed
by allowing lawyers to tell potential clients about the services they
offer. The alleged injuries to the public from letting lawyers advertise
arise, not from evidence about actual injuries, but from rhetorical ar-
guments contained in the briefs of bar association attorneys and in
judicial opinions.
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Deciding whether to permit lawyers to advertise also determines
who will have access to legal services. It is not a coincidence that the
growth of legal clinics took place at the same time that lawyers began
to advertise. Before the United States Supreme Court struck down
prohibitions against legal advertising, it was clear that the restric-
tions prevented many people from obtaining affordable legal assist-
ance. Restricting advertising in the future means that fewer people
will be able to get legal services.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution should
require more than rhetorical arguments. It should, at least, require
that those who want to limit advertising talk about what the limits
will mean in the real world and explain what real dangers exist out
there that justify the proposed limits.
Restrictions on speech by attorneys while representing clients in
trial also have significant consequences for the legal system. Trial
publicity can be beneficial for clients. By speaking out, attorneys can
overcome prejudicial publicity about their clients reported by parties
not subject to a gag rule. Attorneys can, as did Mr. Gentile, point out
possible cases of corruption or improper activity by police and other
government officials. Preventing attorneys from speaking during a
pending trial may interfere with the ability of the citizenry to evaluate
the conduct of government officials, including judges. Again, the First
Amendment should demand more than simple rhetoric to justify the
right of a state bar to prevent attorneys from speaking. While the
Supreme Court has generally prevented attorneys from being disci-
plined for speaking through advertisements or trial publicity, the
standards issued by the Court have been less than helpful in convey-
ing the heavy burden the bar should be required to bear in order to
justify any limits on speech. The Justices of the Supreme Court are
lawyers. Many of them have been members and officers of various
state and national bar associations. They are likely to be familiar
with the policy arguments debated within the legal community about
the advisability of bar restrictions on speech by attorneys. Perhaps
their familiarity with the disciplinary rules and the debates in the
profession about those rules has blinded them to the need for parties
litigating the validity of the rules to present evidence or empirical
data in court. However, their familiarity with the issues does not jus-
tify a refusal to demand the rigorous proof required of other parties
who litigate issues of constitutional dimension.
By clearly informing members of state bars that they will have to
introduce specific evidence of real harm to justify restrictions on the
right of attorneys to speak, the Court would not only be supporting the
values contained in the First Amendment, but would also be prevent-
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ing the organized bar from fiddling around with the rights of attorneys
without having well articulated and supported reasons their actions.
It is time to send a clear message to the organized bar that they
should have more important things to do than to dream up ways to
muzzle attorneys.
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